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“There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of 
power; not organized rivalries but an organized common peace”  
- Woodrow Wilson
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Abstract 
 
In The Law of Peoples John Rawls argues for an international community led by a society of 
liberal democracies committed to spreading peace and just governance. In doing so, he builds on 
Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace, which argued for a similar “League of Peace” to lead other 
nations. Both Kant and Rawls argue for disarmament and pacifism on the part of their leading 
nations. In this thesis, I take issue with Rawls’s pacifism, arguing that the liberal society faces 
threats from terrorism and humanitarian disasters abroad that could compromise their political 
aims to an extent that necessitates a forceful response. Working from this premise, I examine the 
history of philosophy of what constitutes a legitimate use of force. Using a theory of legitimacy 
couched in Jürgen Habermas’s discourse ethics I argue that the liberal states are able to 
legitimately use force abroad. Furthermore, since the legitimating process relies on a 
commitment to discourse, non-liberal states are precluded from taking similar actions. Finally, I 
address objections and in so doing argue that while liberal states may legitimately defend their 
political goals, they must combine such actions with robust aid and assistance abroad and 
rigorous oversight domestically to avoid reliance on force.
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1 
Introduction 
 
 It is often difficult for citizens to reconcile their country’s real actions with their idealized 
vision for what it should be. While political philosophy has provided many blueprints for a just 
society, it is hard to argue that any extant state conforms exactly to thinkers’ guidelines. 
Scholarly consensus has tended towards open and democratic societies, but even in liberal 
democracies expectations far exceed reality. In the United States, gross historical injustices are 
papered over with astonishing regularity in politics, pop-culture, and even the educational 
system. Similarly, many countries in Europe struggle to come to terms with their colonial history 
and its continued effects around the world. While political philosophy has given us something to 
aspire to, the impediments of historical reality can seem insurmountable.  
 If it is difficult for citizens to reconcile injustices at home, then it is potentially harder 
still for them to judge what is happening outside their borders. Likewise, it is difficult for 
political philosophy to engage with the complexities of the international community while still 
coming out the other side with a coherent philosophy of how to make such arrangements “just.” 
Outside of academia attempts to structure the international community often become farcical as 
they run headlong into the realities of international politics. When I first became interested in 
foreign affairs in high school, I was perplexed and disheartened by the contradictions of the 
system. Why were human rights abusers allowed to sit on the UN Human Rights Council? Why 
was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a document to which the vast majority of 
countries have acceded, totally ignored all over the world without protest from the bodies and 
states ostensibly dedicated to its enforcement? The kneejerk response to such questions is 
sometimes to attribute the disrespect for human rights and international law to the lack of an 
enforcement mechanism. However, growing up during the Iraq War, and beginning to study 
  
 
2 
philosophy at Bates as the broader consequences of US involvement started to reveal themselves, 
I was presented with another paradox: despite the moral outrage inspired by crimes against 
humanity it was hard to believe that invading the places where they occur (the most commonly 
cited “enforcement mechanism”) would lead to anything beneficial.  
 I was first interested in the notion of “just war” by my semester abroad in Berlin. After 
decades of empire, followed by a failed democracy, followed by one of the worst dictatorships in 
human history Germany re-entered the community of nations with a flourishing democracy and 
strong economy. Such an accomplishment seemed not to have been possible were it not for the 
Second World War and post-war rebuilding effort. The Freie Universität Berlin (Free University 
of Berlin) that I studied at was founded right after the war in the American sector of West Berlin 
and the “Free” in its title explicitly refers to West German democracy. There were buildings 
named after generals I had read about and there was a John F. Kennedy Institute for North 
American studies. West Berliners in particular, I learned, felt a debt to the Western Allies for the 
Berlin Airlift during the Soviet blockade in 1949 – Germany, it seemed, was as much a success 
story for liberal interventionism as Iraq was a failure. Neither example is that simple; Germany 
had suffered 12 years of dictatorship but was previously a democracy while Iraq was a colonial 
construction drawn without regard for ethnic or religious divides. That said, the precepts of just 
war theory seemed to provide evidence for my hope insofar as the right intentions (defense and 
humanitarianism) of the Second World War had created a democratic ally while the deceit and 
greed behind the invasion of Iraq had led to suffering and despair. Most of just war theory made 
sense to me intuitively, but I found that there was one condition that aroused my old frustrations 
with the international system. If a just war is to be prosecuted one must have “legitimate 
authority” to declare it. Most scholars identify the authority as something approximating the will 
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of the people but are very careful to note that this does not mean only democracies can wage just 
wars. Here again seemed a false equivalence between different types of governments. How is it 
that a country without elections, for example, could embody the will of the people to the degree 
necessary to conduct a war against another state? Increasingly feeling that the heart of my 
problem with international politics was its lack of actor distinctions I began to dig further. The 
actor distinctions I was looking for would, ideally, distinguish between states based on their 
domestic circumstances. Although all states deserve rights, it seemed to me that only those that 
follow international law should be in a position to try and enforce it – the assumption of equality 
between states that treat their citizens wildly differently seemed to be the original sin of the 
international legal system.  
 I first read John Rawls the semester before I went to Berlin in a seminar on “Liberty, 
Equality, and Community.” A Theory of Justice struck me as first and foremost reasonable. The 
original position was a simple but telling way of deciding whether or not a state was just. Liberal 
democracy was a natural outcome of people’s risk aversion when designing a society because it 
was the only form of government that could be expected to balance people’s rights with their 
needs. Learning that Rawls had also written a book on international relations I was hopeful that 
the same reasonableness had been brought to bear on the questions that had frustrated me for 
years. By-and-large I found this was the case. Rawls’s Law of Peoples lays out a vision for 
liberal leadership, but also for toleration. Liberal governance is clearly the goal, but while it is 
expansionary it is not expansionist. Rawls does not envision liberal democracy being bought 
with defense budgets but rather with aid, diplomacy, and the example that liberal states provide 
to the rest of the world. Rawls does have a limited section on just warfare and, although he 
generally conforms to the pacifism of Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace, which had argued for a 
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“League of Peace” not dissimilar to Rawls’s liberal alliance. Although largely satisfied with 
Rawls’s vision for an international community, I was increasingly skeptical of the depth of 
pacifism he expected of his liberal alliance.  
 In the last few years it has seemed to many that liberalism has begun to falter. In the face 
of terrorism governments have taken immense liberties with the rights of their citizens and 
citizens have often proved willing to accept the tradeoff. In the face of economic stagnation and 
mass migration politicians have taken advantage of people’s fears and prejudices to target their 
rights-removal to particular segments of the population. The reasons for this are too numerous to 
address completely in this thesis, but at least some of this can be attributed to failures abroad. 
Reckless foreign policy decisions such as the Iraq War have more than likely contributed to the 
mass migrations now leading to the rise of anti-liberal politics in Europe. In such an atmosphere 
of fear the threat of terrorism and the policies that result is particularly acute as well. With 
liberalism proving to be more fragile than we thought, Rawls’s view of the liberal alliance as an 
aspirational plane from which no state descends back into illiberalism starts to crack under 
pressure. Nonetheless I still have a deep admiration for the Law of Peoples, and though this 
thesis presents my problems with the structure and behavior of the liberal alliance the 
overarching goal is still to develop a structure whereby Rawls’s vision of liberal leadership can 
be achieved in the end.  
 To this end the thesis is presented in four chapters. The first is an introduction to Kant’s 
Perpetual Peace and Rawls’s Law of Peoples. Particular care is given to where the terminology 
of this thesis diverges from Rawls (I explicitly use states, rather than Rawls’s peoples, as the 
actors in question) as well as his classifications of different types of governments and their role 
in the international community. This chapter examines the role of the democratic peace in 
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Rawls’s community. Democratic peace proponents argue that democracies are unlikely to fight 
one another because their citizenry does not want to fight, and because democracies afford their 
people a say in government these states will not go to war with one another. Whether or not there 
is empirical evidence for democratic peace is a hotly contested issue for political scientists, but 
for the purposes of this thesis it will be assumed that at least liberal states will peacefully deal 
with one another. Even if this were not the case generally, it can reasonably be said to apply to 
liberal states that have affirmatively committed to one another as Rawls envisions the liberal 
alliance doing. This has been evidenced by the success of NATO and the European Union in 
curbing interstate conflict, 
 The second chapter deals directly with the threats to liberalism that I feel Rawls has 
overlooked. Drawing on Philip Bobbitt’s Terror and Consent, I identify terrorism and 
humanitarian disasters as the primary threats to liberalism abroad. In the former case I argue that 
large-scale terrorist attacks not only erode public trust in their government for failing to protect 
them, but also that reactions against the perceived lack of security that have the potential to 
undermine essential civil liberties. In the latter case, I argue that humanitarian disasters abroad 
undermine liberal governance in two ways: first, the goal of developing liberalism in other states 
cannot be achieved if liberal states are seen as mere bystanders when the essential rights of 
others are abrogated. Second, the longer a humanitarian emergency persists the harder it will be 
to reconcile groups at the end, precluding the transition from “outlaw” status that should be the 
end goal of any liberal intervention. Further, I argue that both of these circumstances require 
forceful action on the part of the liberal states in order to preclude these negative effects. 
 The demand for forceful intervention raises a question of legitimacy crucial to the rest of 
the thesis. Why are liberal states allowed to step outside the bounds of narrow self-defense? Are 
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other states allowed similar recourse against these problems? In order to answer these questions, 
I work through the history of legitimacy, starting from Aquinas and the first formulation of the 
“legitimate authority” condition in just war theory. Next I move on to Hugo Grotius, the first 
secular just war scholar, and discuss how his conflation of sovereign authority with near-
unlimited access to the legitimate use of force allowed centuries of warfare and colonization. 
Tracing the decline of unlimited national sovereignty after World War Two, I examine two 
competing trends of legitimacy studies in international relations: analytical legitimacy wherein 
empirical evidence is studied to see what compels actors to follow rules, and normative 
legitimacy wherein the philosophical and legal dimensions of what makes an act legitimate are 
interrogated. Finding neither entirely sufficient to explain whether or not collective action by the 
liberal alliance is legitimate, I turn to Corneliu Bjola’s “deliberative legitimacy.” Based in Jürgen 
Habermas’s discourse ethics, Bjola advocates a three-step check for legitimacy wherein all 
relevant actors must be included in a discussion, all must possess the fullest possible knowledge 
of the situation, and all must have a genuine interest in the deliberations. If these conditions are 
met, then an action by that group is considered legitimate. Next, I argue that the liberal states are 
likely to follow the precepts of deliberative legitimacy as rules for their interventions in the 
interest of preserving the legitimacy of the liberal project. As for other states, I argue that without 
domestic democratic structures to drive “genuine interest” in the deliberations other states which 
are not liberal are precluded from taking the same actions as the liberal alliance. Furthermore, 
because the threats of terrorism and humanitarian emergency present a political threat that is 
unique to liberalism decent states cannot be considered relevant actors, even though they are 
tolerated as members of international community.  
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 Rawls strove in all his works for a “realistic utopia” that is, a society as close to utopia as 
could be realistically accomplished. Although I provide structural reasons why liberal states 
typically follow the rules of deliberative legitimacy, the international community is, as 
mentioned, messy and complicated, thus the fourth and final chapter addresses non-ideal theory 
and the possible pitfalls of liberal interventionism. The first objection addressed is the possibility 
of liberal abuse abroad. Although outright colonialism has often been cloaked in 
humanitarianism, I feel it is unreasonable to assume that liberal states would engage in such 
blatant conquest. Therefore, this section mostly focuses on the co-opting of humanitarian 
missions for private business interests. Although a tempting circumstance for the unscrupulous, 
my conclusion is that the multi-lateral decision making of the liberal alliance, when coupled with 
Rawlsian liberalism’s strict limitation of private influence in government make such exploitation 
unlikely. Secondly, I consider the effect that prolonged conflict or war-footing has on domestic 
liberalism. Noting the tendency of states at war towards paranoia and corruption, I argue that in 
order to avoid being drawn into conflicts they need not be, the liberal states must take measures 
to provide public oversight to prevent bureaucratic incentives from taking over decision-making. 
Thirdly, I consider the relationship of force to legitimacy in a more abstract sense, reflecting an 
argument made by Hannah Arendt in Reflections on Violence. She argues that violence is the 
opposite of power, in the sense that a state only resorts to violence when its power or legitimacy 
is waning. There are some circumstances where violence is called for, but broadly I accept 
Arendt’s critique and argue that the liberal states should seek to be extremely judicious in its 
employment. I take this as further evidence that liberal states must have strong domestic 
institutions capable and a rigorous politics of oversight and accountability to avoid expending 
their legitimacy in the form of force when it is not called for. Furthermore, I argue, as does 
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Rawls, that since material deprivation gives rise to the situations where force would be required 
liberal states ought to undertake a robust system of aid and assistance to other nations in order to 
avoid using force.  
 The challenge of this thesis is to show that Rawls’s liberal alliance must occasionally 
resort to force in order to achieve its liberal foreign policy. In so doing, my thesis moves from 
the ideal theory and democratic peace into non-ideal theory when discussing the likely responses 
to of terrorism and humanitarian disaster. Discussing liberal responses to these problems, I revert 
briefly to an ideal theory of rules-based deliberation within the liberal alliance before turning to 
non-ideal theory and the many stumbling blocks facing nations which accept war as sometimes 
legitimate face. In this last section, I develop the main conclusion: just as democracy is not 
sufficient for a society to be just, force alone cannot stop illiberal forces. The roots of these 
problems must be dealt with as well, and liberal states must take care not to betray their own 
ideals even as they fight to protect them. The very ability of liberal states to fight legitimately 
against terrorism and crimes against humanity is a result of unique governmental structures that 
emphasize deliberation and consensus.  
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Chapter 1 
Democratic Peace and the Liberal Order 
 
 Political philosophy has traditionally been inward looking, asking questions of justice and 
obligations on the individual level and building upward towards a state that can satisfy the needs 
of its constituents. While philosophers have often considered the role that state boundaries play 
in individual obligations towards one another (e.g. Singer’s effective altruism) many have 
ignored the question of states’ interactions with one another as distinct political units. Because 
many of the theories that do deal with such interactions develop their own rationale for state and 
citizen action, it is important to establish a common understanding of state interaction and 
behavior for the rest of this thesis. In this chapter, I will defend three premises that will serve as 
the basis for my argumentation. First, I will define the state and its role as the primary actor of 
concern in a philosophy of international relations. Second, I will draw on John Rawls’s Law of 
Peoples to categorize states based on their government’s arrangement and fulfillment of 
obligations to its citizenry. Third, I will discuss the theory of democratic peace and how it 
eventually contributes to the proliferation of more just, stable, and peaceable international 
community.  
 
Defining the State 
 While there is no absolute scholarly consensus on what a state actually is, most scholars 
fall back on some form of the definition proffered by Max Weber. Weber’s definition of the state 
broke with earlier conceptions by divorcing it from ends or aspirations and focusing purely on 
the means by which a state governs (Pierson 1996: 7). This distinction is critical to this thesis 
because it rests in large part on differentiating states from one another by their governing and 
moral systems. Thus, a definition of statehood independent that focuses on the commonalities 
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between states is crucial, as is setting aside the different means by which they achieve the 
legitimacy described in Weber’s definition. Weber’s definition of the state is:  
“A compulsory political organization with continuous operations will be called a 
‘state’ insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claims to the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order 
[…] 
 “It possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by 
legislation, to which the organized activities of the administrative staff, which are 
also controlled by regulations, are oriented. This system of orders claims binding 
authority, not only over members of the state, the citizens, most of whom have 
obtained membership by birth, but also to a very large extent over all action 
taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory organization 
with a territorial basis.” (Weber 1978: 54-6) 
 
There are a few things to note about Weber’s definition. First, the monopoly on violence is 
concerned chiefly with the legitimacy and monopoly thereof, not the violence itself. That is to 
say, the state should not need to resort to widespread direct violence in order to impose its will if 
its will is generally considered to be legitimate. A corollary to the monopoly on violence that is 
not explicated by Weber but equally, if not more important is the “unitary order of violence” 
(Pierson 1996: 11). The modern state grew out of Europe’s transition from feudalism to 
absolutism, a process that involved the consolidation of pluralistic sources of authority into one 
legitimating structure. Because of this, all states have maintained one ultimate source of 
legitimate power, primarily as a means to the pacification of their societies. Unlike feudal lords, 
who often found themselves “legitimately” in violent confrontations with one another despite 
ostensibly answering to the same sovereign, modern state violence is exercised hierarchically 
and in a distinctly downward direction (Pierson 1996: 11). Because of this, federal states can be 
constituted of different subordinate polities that are held peacefully together by the overarching 
state. 
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 The second important aspect of Weber’s theory is its emphasis on territoriality and 
continuity, i.e. the state’s relative independence from its government. When the governing party 
of the United States changes from Democrat to Republican, it is not considered a change in state 
because the exercise of authority is legitimated the same way (through the US Constitution) 
across the same territory. New states only come into existence when the legitimating authority in 
a given area is changed. This can happen to an entire state, such as the replacement of divine 
right of the Tsar with the dictatorship of the proletariat as the legitimating authority in the 
Russian Revolution. It can also happen to a specific piece of territory, such as the replacement of 
the British Raj’s authority with that of the Indian parliament in 1947. Conversely, states can be 
considered destroyed if their authority no longer holds sway in their territory, as happened to 
Austria upon its annexation by Nazi Germany in 1938 and the replacement of the authority from 
Vienna with the authority from Berlin.  
 The third piece of Weber’s definition is citizenship. This is important to distinguish from 
territoriality because, while the state claims authority over everyone who is in its territory it is 
only the citizenry that “belongs” to that state even when outside of its borders. To be considered 
a citizen is to be recognized as having a special and formalized relationship with the state in 
question (Pierson 1996: 29). Citizenship covers a wide and often ambiguous set of obligations 
and privileges, but there are several broad trends worth exploring. While everyone within the 
state’s borders may be entitled to protection by its power, only citizens are afforded access to its 
political system. Abstractly this is true even of authoritarian states that deny citizens democratic 
participation but may offer positions in the civil service or military that allows them to exercise 
power denied to mere residents. In exchange for these privileges states will sometimes levy 
obligations in exchange, but this phenomenon is less generalizable than the giving of privileges. 
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Regardless of its parameters, the offering of citizenship to a group more limited than the set of 
people within its borders is a key aspect of the modern state.  
 
Why States 
 This thesis’ line of argumentation will deal principally with contrasting states’ 
international legitimacy through an evaluation of their government type. In the interest of 
creating an accessible metric by which to categorize states I will use the sorting system of John 
Rawls’s Law of Peoples. However, before doing so I will defend my exclusion of a key element 
of Rawls’s theory: the treatment of “peoples” rather than states as the meaningful actor.  
 Even before that discussion it is worth explaining another departure from Rawls via the 
exclusion of the original position. The original position is a thought experiment first introduced 
in Rawls’s Theory of Justice wherein the measure of a society’s justness is the ability of someone 
without any knowledge of their lot in life (e.g. sex, race, wealth etc.) could meaningfully consent 
into a society. Rawls reasoned that, people being generally risk averse, a society planned from 
the original position would be one that treated its lowliest members fairly because anyone 
planning it from the original position could end up as anyone within the society they planned. 
That is to say, without knowing what your circumstances would be, you would not create a 
society of great inequality and suffering and simply roll the dice on the fact that you would be a 
millionaire. Rawls’s intent with the Law of Peoples was to apply this same rationale to an 
international system in order to see what would be considered just. This thesis focuses on the 
specific question of the legitimate use of force internationally and its relation to the goals of 
liberal states.  
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 Rawls’s decision to use peoples as his actors comes from his desire to place them in the 
original position. In reviewing this decision, he characterizes states thusly: 
“[states] are often seen as rational, anxiously concerned with their power – their 
capacity (military, economic, diplomatic) to influence other states – and always 
guided by their basic interests. […] How far states differ from peoples rests on 
how rationality, the concern with power, and a state’s basic interests are filled in. 
If rationality excludes the reasonable (that is, if a state is moved by the aims it 
has and ignores the criterion of reciprocity in dealing with other societies); if a 
state’s concern with power is predominant; and if it’s interests include such things 
as converting other societies to the state’s religion, enlarging its empire and 
winning territory, gaining dynastic or imperial or national prestige and glory, and 
increasing its relative economic strength – then the difference between states and 
peoples is enormous” (Rawls 2001: 28) 
 
It is precisely this characterization of states that demands contention. Even before Rawls the 
realist conception of states as power-hungry was challenged by liberal theorists of international 
relations, and world opinion on the unlimited sovereignty of states has likewise shifted in the 
wake of the humanitarian disasters of the 1990s. But even if one accepts Rawls’s 
characterization of states, it is important to understand that it is Rawls’s reliance on the original 
position that drives his reluctance to write a theory of interstate relations. In describing a theory 
of legitimacy across nations, it is important to consider the actual conditions of the international 
community. The competing interests of states are what cause the non-ideal world that we live in. 
Given that this thesis deals with issues such as terrorism and crimes against humanity, it must 
presuppose non-ideal conditions in order to have a workable theory, and thus states must be the 
actor in question. Furthermore, Rawls’s two primary concerns with statehood are their 
preoccupation with power and their sovereign power as the final authority in a given territory As 
they concern themselves with the way a society is ordered through governmental and other 
structures, Rawls’s categorizations of peoples are easily applied to states. 
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Categories of States 
   It is important for clarity and brevity’s sake to apply some sort of categorization to states 
based on their government and their peoples’ conditions. Because of Rawls’s stature there is 
ample literature surrounding the Law of Peoples and thus widespread understanding of his five 
categories of peoples (or states, for our purposes and heretofore in this thesis).  These categories 
are meant to be useful shorthand for the general structure of the international community, and in 
several cases it will be necessary to explore cases more specific than the general conditions 
expressed in the categories. In these cases, the assignment of the states in those cases to one or 
another of the categories is too macro of a viewpoint and not particularly useful. Thus, the 
category of states should be treated as a label of convenience only applied when it is necessary to 
describe large groups of states. 
Liberal States 
 The first category of states are liberal, in that they generally conform to a liberal-
democratic constitution and conditions of the reasonable pluralism described by Rawls. Like 
Rawls, I feel that examining specific institutional structures that lead to a just constitutional order 
is too broad for the purposes of a work dedicated primarily to interactions between states. That 
said, there are a few characteristics that can be generalized to liberal states as a class: first, their 
governments are accountable to their citizens and are not dominated by the economic interests of 
one particular group. Second, they afford their citizens basic human rights and political 
participation, regardless of race, gender, religious affiliation, etc. While Rawls recognizes that 
“peoples” in his case are frequently organized along ethnic, linguistic, or religious lines it is 
reasonable that in order to be considered liberal a state must have structures that at least attempt 
to supersede these divides (Rawls 2001: 30). States like Germany or France would qualify as 
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liberal in this regard, as their dominant culture does not impede (legally) on the rights of their 
citizens that are not of that culture. 
Decent States 
 Rawls describes decent non-liberal states as those that are necessarily tolerated by liberal 
states in the international sphere, although their internal structures may not be “just” in the liberal 
sense. They are necessarily tolerated as a fact of international relations. Although Rawls 
supposes a society of liberal peoples, he recognizes that the society cannot exist completely 
sealed off or at odds with the rest of the international community.  In order to illustrate the 
qualities of a decent society Rawls imagines the fictional country of “Kazanistan.” The dominant 
religion is Islam, and political life is only extended to Muslims, but believers of other religions 
are encouraged to develop independent cultural lives. Importantly, Kazanistan secures for its 
citizens most basic human rights, regardless of their religious affiliation. Also crucial for the 
decent label is the lack of territorial or other aggressive intentions (Rawls 2001: 77-78). In short, 
a decent society must secure basic rights for all its citizens, allow political representation to at 
least most of its citizens, and possess no territorial or otherwise aggressive ambitions. I will be 
looser with the last condition than Rawls, for it is true that many generally peaceful states lay 
claim to territory beyond their borders for historic reasons, but do not act upon them. In dealing 
with peoples Rawls was concerned primarily with their intentions in the ordering of their society 
from the original position, but as this thesis will be dealing with states I will allow for decent 
states to have ambitions so long as aggressive action is not taken. 
 Rawls defines a fifth category, benevolent absolutisms, as states that respect human rights 
but deny political representation. Here again I will part ways with Rawls and fold the category of 
benevolent absolutisms into the category of decent states for two reasons. First, there are many 
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societies that exhibit the behavior of Rawls’s ideal but do not adhere to the various internal 
structures he desires. In a state like Turkey or Kenya, democracy may come and go depending on 
the government and power may be heavily concentrated in private hands. That said, for the 
purposes of the international community they are tolerable actors in that they mostly respect the 
non-political basic rights of their citizenry. Second, Rawls’s limiting of political representation to 
participatory democracies is quite narrow for a work supposedly advocating toleration of 
“illiberal” states/peoples. Even in a one-party-state like China there can be said to be political 
representation in the form of advancement through centralized bureaucracy to progressively 
larger decision-making positions.  
Burdened States 
 Burdened states are saddled with what Rawls describes as “unfavorable conditions.” 
These conditions could include (but are not limited to) a lack of human capital, material 
resources, or political and cultural tradition (Rawls 2001: 106). Rawls is deliberately unspecific, 
but I will apply this category to “failed” states such as Somalia or South Sudan, whose 
authorities are unable to satisfy the basic needs of their citizens. Rawls’s main distinction 
between burdened states and “outlaw” states (covered in the next section) is that burdened states 
do not harbor any designs on their neighbors. Thus, it is fair to assume that even states that have 
failed due to their own inability can be considered burdened, even though their “circumstances” 
are essentially of their own doing.  
Outlaw States 
 Outlaw states refuse to abide by international law and willfully deprive or ignore the 
rights of their citizens. The definition of outlaw is in some ways dependent on the system of 
international laws in place, but there are some generalizable characteristics. States that commit 
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crimes against humanity generally speaking, such as ethnic cleansing or genocide, would be 
considered outlaw states. This is inclusive of incompetence that results in mass atrocities such as 
Mao or Stalin’s famines, so long as they are willful, thus distinguishing them the burdened 
societies who have the inclination but not the ability to care for their populace. States that are 
belligerent toward other states in pursuit of territory or some other “unjust” goal are also 
considered outlaws.  
 
Democratic Peace and the Expansion of Liberal Ideals 
 Realistically most of the world’s states would fall outside the liberal category, and 
theorists of international relations have long struggled with how to square liberal ideals of 
toleration with governmental structures not their own. Law of Peoples is written in a 
philosophical tradition that begins with Immanuel Kant, that argues liberal cooperation 
necessarily leads to the expansion of liberal structures over the globe. This theory is grounded in 
the theory of democratic peace: the idea that democracies (liberal states) feel kinship and 
sympathy with one another and do not go to war with one another as a result. The liberal states, 
all at peace and cooperating one another, will provide an example for other states to emulate, 
eventually spreading their way of life everywhere. This section will situate this thesis within the 
historical liberal/democratic peace tradition, and discuss the role of issues such as membership 
and the relative weighing of external vs. internal conceptions of democracy moving forward. 
 The theory of democratic peace was first proffered in Kant’s 1795 essay Perpetual 
Peace. Kant’s essay starts with a series of preliminary conditions for the establishment of 
perpetual peace, including the abolition of standing armies, national debts, and “dishonorable” 
espionage (Kant). These preliminary conditions have resurfaced from time to time in 
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international thought, particularly after the First World War, but have for the most part been 
discarded by subsequent liberal theorists as fanciful (even in Rawls’s ideal world). Kant provides 
the argument for “definitive” peace in the next section, stating that all states should possess a 
republican constitution, that the republics should band together in a league of peace, and that 
world citizenship should be unlimited (Kant). To the first article, Kant considers non-republican 
states to be essentially “formless” because they do not properly channel the will of the citizenry. 
For Kant, the citizen-focused nature of republican governments secures peace because the 
citizenry, having to bear the costs of the war both human and economic, will be unwilling to 
casually commence one in the manner that a despot, who does not need to personally bear the 
costs, is able to. Because of this, Kant claims, it is natural that the citizens of the various 
republics would form their states into a “League of Peace” dedicated to the prevention of warfare 
and the expansion of republicanism through example. Although Kant’s mechanisms are 
somewhat unclear, and many argue that he meant “republic” in the semi-aristocratic sense of the 
early United States, he laid the groundwork for future scholars of liberal foreign policy. 
 Rawls explicitly situates Law of Peoples in the tradition launched by Kant, going so far as 
to say that, “the basic idea [of the argument of the Law of Peoples] is to follow Kant’s lead [in 
Perpetual Peace]” (Rawls 2001: 10). The basic trajectory of Rawls’ argument follows the same 
path, but he makes several changes. Firstly, Kant’s preliminary conditions are dropped, and 
states are presumed to have standing armies and other means of defense (including treaties and 
espionage) although their use is severely limited. Secondly, Rawls dispenses with Kant’s notion 
of a federated “League of Peace” in favor of a looser “society of peoples.” Kant sought 
overarching authority in order to secure the rights of the liberal citizens and to constrain national 
ambition. Eventually this federation would consist of every state on earth and would effectively 
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be a world government. While Rawls does believe the democratic peace between liberal states 
will eventually spread, he does not necessarily envision its spread to every corner of the globe. 
Given the facts of “reasonable pluralism,” or the abundance of different beliefs and notions of 
the good life, it would be contrary to liberalism’s own instincts for toleration to presume that 
non-liberal states were unjust on the face of it. Rawls’ distinctions between states now come into 
play in understanding what kinds of governments deserve our toleration. However, even with 
broad principles of toleration in place Rawls accepts that the basic mission of his liberal foreign 
policy is to eventually spread those ideals throughout the world.   
 
Conditions for Inclusion in the Liberal Society   
 This thesis, as with Kant and Rawls, places a “liberal society”1at the forefront of its 
analysis. For supporters of the democratic peace such an organization is a natural outgrowth of 
the peaceful cooperation between liberal states. Although acknowledging Rawls’s limited 
concern for the more technical aspects of contemporary international relations theory, Chris 
Brown tentatively places Rawls within the “English School” by virtue of his support for a 
“society” of like-minded states (Brown 2002: 12). The members of the English School believed 
that even in conditions of anarchy states’ overriding concern is restricting violence much as 
domestic societies is. Unlike the realists who maintain that power is the sole concern of states, 
the English School is at least amicable to Rawls’s distinction between the “rational” and the 
“reasonable” – allowing for the power of shared ideals to shape “societies” of states just as much 
as self-preservation (Bull 1984: 1-2).  
                                                
1 For precision’s sake I will refer to this liberal society as the “society of liberal states” or simply “liberal states” in 
order to make clear that I am referring to the organization of states that are liberal as opposed to a single state whose 
society is organized along liberal lines.  
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 Who is to be included in the society of liberal states? In non-ideal theory, it must be 
accepted that states exist on a spectrum of justice and that there will be borderline cases between 
the liberal and the decent, or even between the decent and the outlaw. In these cases, it is 
stability of institutions that must be preferred. This means that in borderline cases where a 
domestic situation may be closer to decent than liberal, a state’s cooperation with the existing or 
more entrenched members of the society of liberal states can make the difference. While it is not 
unreasonable to argue that a state like China has a just internal system for delivering goods to its 
citizens, it hardly plays by the rules of liberal states and frequently behaves aggressively. A state 
such as India on the other hand, while rife with corruption and economic problems, at least 
attempts to progress toward a more liberal government and more importantly cooperates with 
liberal states and (with limited exceptions) abides by the guidelines set up by them. In these 
types of cases, we will assume that the state that is more willing to cooperate with liberal states 
will be given the benefit of the doubt, while those that are not will be excluded regardless of 
internal justice. Again, it is important to emphasize that this test applies in “borderline” cases – 
Saudi Arabia does not deserve inclusion in any society of liberal states merely by its friendship 
of convenience with the states in question  
 This preference for inclusion via cooperation allows states to become a part of the 
peaceful and stable order established by cooperation with other liberal states. Seeing as liberal 
states will not be in conflict with one another it allows the kind of flourishing of society that 
naturally leads to more just internal structures in the first place. One of Rawls’ key arguments in 
Law of Peoples is that political evils such as radicalism and intolerance come from instability 
and material depravation. If issues of subsistence and basic protection are settled, people will 
naturally turn to more abstract questions of political structure and representation. In preferring 
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cooperation with liberal countries over some sort of strict constitutional test the goals of liberal 
foreign policy are achieved through the promotion of stability and through the plausible 
expansion of liberal governance to the rest of the world. 
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Chapter 2 
The Necessity of Liberal Intervention 
 
 The goals of the liberal society described by Rawls and Kant are fundamentally pacifistic. 
In order to spread just political structure and promote unity of states there must first be peace. 
Kant proscribes arms altogether while Rawls, save an unelaborated admission that humanitarian 
crises sometimes require military responses, allows for force only in self-defense. In this section 
I will outline two exceptions that I argue are necessary for the achievement of the peaceful world 
toward which the liberal society strives. In the case of international terrorism, it is necessary to 
preempt attacks that have the potential to destroy liberal governance through fear. In the case of 
humanitarian disasters, it is necessary for liberal society to do all within its power to stop them, 
or else the liberal project will lose legitimacy as a provider of peace and prosperity. 
Modern International Terrorism 
 While there is no universally agreed upon definition of what constitutes terrorism, the 
purpose is always “to destroy the morale of a nation or class, to undercut its solidarity; its 
method is the random murder of innocent people” (Walzer 2015: 197). The use of terror has 
existed as long as warfare, but the addition of the ideological “-ism” suffix is unique to a modern 
conception of warfare that treats civilian lives as separate from those of combatants and thus 
worth preserving. While political terror in the modern sense started with state terror (Chaliand 
2016: 95-6) in the French Revolution, its modern iterations – particularly since the Second 
World War – has been characterized by small groups using terror as a force multiplier against 
forces significantly more powerful than themselves (Chaliand 2016: 222). In the late 20th Century 
terrorism was primarily associated with nationalist causes such as the reunification of Northern 
Ireland with the Republic of Ireland, the freedom of Algeria from French colonialism, and the 
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freedom of Palestine from Israeli occupation. With the exception of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO), these organizations duly focused on terrorizing specific adversaries and did 
not extend their influence internationally. As early as the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan this 
began to change, and the roots of modern international terrorism began to take hold.  
 The modern terrorist organization is defined by its fragmented nature and lack of formal 
hierarchy, a development that is the result of several trends. First, the philosophical shift from 
finite political goals, usually limited to one country (i.e. the Provisional IRA seeking to include 
Northern Ireland in the Irish Republic) to global ambitions that seek radical change in many 
countries (Ganor 2011: 29). In the late 20th and early 21st Centuries this has been exemplified by 
radical Islamist terrorism that seeks to destabilize Western and Western-backed regimes in order 
to impose “true” Islamic government in place of secular or otherwise “apostate” governments 
(Brookings Institution 2015). These organizations have been the dominant focus of both 
government and academic study, but for the purposes of this thesis the threats they represent 
could also be rooted in any revolutionary ideology with the destruction of current governments 
as its goal. The second trend accelerating the internationalization of terrorism is the modern 
media environment, particularly the internet. The ability to communicate on the internet allows 
terrorist networks to access and inspire recruits without ever having to meet them. This has been 
a significant factor in the rise of “homegrown” terrorism; terrorists ideologically aligned with the 
“parent” group but not necessarily involved organizationally (Ganor 2011: 32). Furthermore, this 
allows the parent group to plausibly claim attacks that it had nothing to do with organizationally, 
further spreading its ideology, influence, and destabilizing effects with minimal cost or 
traceability. Importantly, this unifies the threat posed by organizations such as Al-Qaeda and the 
Islamic State (ISIS) that otherwise differ in their preferred targets. The third trend is the ability of 
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terrorist organizations to move funds across borders. This further separates the planners and 
executors of terrorist actions, allowing the leadership to fund attacks that are independently 
planned and carried out. It also allows financiers of terrorism to better remain at arm’s length, 
increasing its attractiveness to states as a tool of policy.   
 
The Threat of Terrorism to Liberal States 
 Let us postulate an anti-globalization and anti-liberal terrorist organization whose 
ultimate goal is the destruction of the liberal order described by Rawls and a return to the 
inviolable sovereignty of the pre-WW2 world. They have secured the backing of several wealthy 
financiers around the globe who consider the organization’s cause to be just, and have used the 
money and connections to obtain a strain of a heretofore eradicated disease from a biological 
weapons research facility. Seeking to strike a blow against liberal states in general, but 
particularly the world financial order, they endeavor to release the disease in the financial capital 
of a large liberal state. The disease quickly takes hold and after several weeks results in the 
essential quarantining of the financial capital, a plunge in world markets, and, after the terrorist 
organization claims responsibility, widespread fear and panic. The next parliamentary elections 
result in a victory for the party which promises overbearing police presence, random searches 
and testing of those suspected of carrying what is now an epidemic disease, detainment and 
quarantining for those found positive, and curtailment of public assembly due to the risk of 
infection. 
The Liberal-Democratic Dilemma 
 The above scenario, however hyperbolic, is exemplary of a conundrum facing liberal 
states who become the targets of terrorist organizations – the difficulty in preventing attacks and 
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upholding public trust while simultaneously adhering to the rights and processes of their liberal 
constitutions. To be clear, the vast majority of terrorist actions are tragic but not catastrophic. 
Infrequent and unprofessional attacks executed by one or two people acting alone do not pose an 
existential threat to liberalism. That said, any terrorist organization serious about bringing down 
an entire government longs for the opportunity to destroy an entire city or something 
comparable, for without such a scale the legitimacy of government protection will not be 
challenged. The easiest way to prevent terrorist attacks from occurring would likely involve a 
kind of universal citizen database coupled with round-the-clock surveillance. Here, anyone 
suspicious could be instantly detained and their background and travels known – cracking open a 
vial in a subway or leaving a car for too long in a lobby would be impossible without a law 
enforcement response. Such a state, while undoubtedly safe, does not secure its citizens the same 
rights as a liberal democracy and would probably be miserable to live in anyway. If the purpose 
of a liberal state is to allow for all kinds of people to live together pursuing their own individual 
interests then such a state as described above is untenable and fundamentally illiberal. Boaz 
Ganor, a scholar of international terrorism, has described this as the “liberal-democratic 
dilemma” which is described as follows: 
“the more inclined a decision maker is to safeguard his state’s liberal democratic 
values, the larger the berth given the terrorist. Conversely, a decision maker who 
is willing to compromise liberal democratic values to combat terrorism verifies 
the terrorists’ claim that they face an immoral, illegitimate regime” (Ganor 2015: 
35) 
 
In other words, this is not just a problem of the erosion of liberal values for the state, it is also a 
problem in that it cedes further moral ground to the terrorist organization itself that claims liberal 
regimes are fundamentally illegitimate. Further complicating matters is that, in a liberal 
democracy, decision makers do not act in a vacuum; they must answer to electorates and face the 
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pressures of other politicians who may try to outflank on issues of safety and security in the 
wake of a deadly terrorist attack. These pressures lead decision makers to make compromises on 
issues of civil liberties that, while minor at first, undermine the legitimacy of the regime as 
liberal and democratic.  
 Rawls’s political liberalism is closely tied up with the notion of “reasonable” citizens: 
those who accept that others have differing comprehensive views of the good (reasonable 
pluralism) and wish the government to legitimately govern in a manner that respects this fact. 
Accomplishing this feat involves the limitation of discourse to “public reason” that is not 
reflective of any one comprehensive vision of the good: thus allowing all people, regardless of 
personal identification with a religion or ideology to build democratic coalitions and govern 
together. So long as citizens remain reasonable liberal states so conceived are resilient to the 
worst excesses of the liberal-democratic dilemma such as targeting specific ethnic or religious 
groups due to perceived affiliation with terrorist organizations. It does not, however, completely 
insulate liberal states from self-destructing by way of civil liberties curtailment. Reasonableness, 
as defined by Rawls, is contingent upon conditions of reciprocity wherein all citizens could 
reasonably be expected to adhere to the laws which are passed. Even the perception of having 
one’s safety compromised can be enough to change what people are “reasonably” expected to 
bear. While it may not be reasonable to put up with closed-circuit TV cameras on every street 
corner for safety before a terrorist attack, the aftermath thereof – including the potential talk of 
ways it could be prevented – may be sufficient to convince otherwise dedicated liberals that 
safety should be prioritized. Rawls himself argues in the Law of Peoples that there exists a 
concrete hierarchy of needs and it is a lynchpin of the entire theory that civil and political rights 
are essentially the last thing to be achieved. Burdened states, we are told, cannot possibly 
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become liberal until their state of material deprivation is ameliorated. Similarly, outlaw and 
decent states will not become liberal until the needs of safety and security have been established 
via the growing democratic peace. If safety and security is a requirement for liberal governance 
than it stands to reason that the deprivation of safety and security by a large-scale terrorist attack 
would lead to backsliding out of liberalism.  
 Not only is this a problem for the citizens of the state in question who are now choosing 
to live under increasingly illiberal conditions, it is a problem for the society of liberal states in 
general. The liberal project is one of quiet expansion by example: states seeking security and 
material gain will gravitate towards the liberal states who, due to the freedom afforded their 
citizens and peaceful coexistence with one another, are premier providers of both. In a process of 
conversion, the loss a prior convert is the obvious set back, but there are also optical challenges 
that such a situation would pose for the society of liberal states writ large. In both Rawls and 
Kant’s formulation of democratic peace the regime change is affected by mutual consent of the 
people in states transitioning to democracy. They do so because they want the security associated 
with being in the society of liberal states. However, if safety and security are prerequisites for 
liberalism, then presumably liberalism – the next step, as it were – should be able to retain the 
security they achieve. In the traditional theories, this is explained by the democratic peace theory 
i.e. because the main threats to a state’s security are other states it is the immersion in a group of 
peaceful and allied states that will bring it the most safety. This assumption of security is lost at 
the point when non-state actors pose as great or worse a threat to people’s safety than other states 
do. It is in this manner that the terrorist attack which poses a danger to the citizens of only liberal 
state poses an acute political threat for the entire liberal project, and thus the goals of all the 
liberal states together.  
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The Necessity of Preemption 
 If we assume that attacks of the nature described are inevitable eventually and if 
liberalism is this valid to terrorist attack then the only solution to such a problem is the 
prevention of the attack in the first place. Law enforcement and traditional methods of crime 
prevention would hopefully be sufficient to prevent any such attacks being planned and 
orchestrated from within liberal states. However, it is likely that at least the leadership of a 
terrorist organization will operate outside of the target country for the reasons mentioned above: 
it separates them from the people actually executing the attack, providing an intelligence break, 
and it allows them to better plan multiple actions at once. Thus, the only option remaining for a 
liberal state wishing to stay safe is an attack on the leadership of the organization, without which 
a catastrophic attack could not be orchestrated. It would be valid, at this point, to challenge this 
thesis on the grounds that it had set out to expose a flaw in the democratic peace theory (that 
liberalism cannot be sustained in the face of terrorism by self-defense alone) and that now it 
appears to suggest the solution is preemptive strikes on terrorist organizations: an action 
commonly understood as self-defense. Superficially this challenge is correct, and it is indeed 
deeper in the intent and practical considerations of the preemption that the differences with self-
defense lie.  
 The difference in intent lies with the collective political goals of the society of liberal 
states. While they may differ slightly in structure, size, economy, and individual goals they are 
all fundamentally linked through peaceful cooperation in the society. Furthermore, the society is 
not merely a club for like-minded states, it exists with a particular goal in mind in the form of 
spreading liberalism. While narrow conceptions of self-defense such as Rawls’s may permit a 
state to strike terrorists outside its border if there is conclusive evidence of an imminent attack it 
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does not reflect the threat such an attack would pose to the collective. Importantly, it would not 
allow the liberal states as a collective to launch a preemptive strike. The collective element, 
which will be explored in depth in the next chapter, is essential for the maintenance of 
international legitimacy by the society of liberal states and thus the accomplishment of its goals.  
 The second element that divorces the actions of the society of liberal states from self-
defense is the question of imminence and the unique position that terrorist organizations assume 
in the discourse of conflict and defense. An anticipatory strike is only permissible if conditions 
point to an imminent attack, and while those days and weeks before a specific action do exist 
with terrorist organizations they are also in the unique position of being in a state of conflict 
without very much shooting. The leadership of both the organization and the liberal state being 
targeted are hostile to one another even when not directly engaged. This limbo is worrisome for 
the society of liberal states and its plans for preemption. Similar considerations have allowed the 
United States to justify a campaign of targeted assassination that has resulted in many civilian 
deaths which has in turn been used as a recruiting tool for the very organizations being targeted 
(Cronin 2013: 48). Combined with the electoral incentive of “doing something” which could 
potentially spur further action even when not totally supported by intelligence the risk of slipping 
into such an overzealous campaign is significant. Here the collective action of liberal states is 
important, as acting together to defend political ideals rather than working unilaterally to prevent 
the deaths of citizens leads to a very different political calculus, wherein the ability to defend an 
action afterwards on the basis of liberal values is more important than immediate action. While 
intelligence gathering by nature is conducted in secret, one of Rawls’s conditions for a liberal 
constitution is the ability to hold their government to account. Given that liberal societies 
concern themselves primarily with peaceful coexistence it is logical that people within those 
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societies would demand high standards of evidence from their governments if those governments 
were forced to use force abroad.  
 
Humanitarian Intervention 
 For Rawls, a crucial condition for liberal foreign policy is stability. Without stability, 
there will be no spread of liberal ideas and structure which the society of liberal states relies on 
to provide world leadership will be undermined. Rawls admits that in his non-ideal theory there 
will be outlaw states which abuse their own citizens and commit crimes against both them and 
other nations. Responding to outlaw aggression is the only time that Rawls considers it necessary 
to turn to armed force. The Law of Peoples contains tacit endorsement for such harsh dealings 
with outlaw states: “Outlaw states are aggressive and dangerous; all people are safer and more 
secure if such states change, or are forced to change, their ways. Otherwise they deeply affect the 
international climate of violence and power” (Rawls 2001: 81). This, however, is a somewhat 
lukewarm appeal when considering the scale of the issue. Not only do such states pose a threat to 
the stability of the international system, their actions have the potential to undermine liberal 
states in similar ways to terrorist threats, as well as posing a direct threat to liberal leadership. 
 
The Threat of Humanitarian Disaster 
 Let us imagine a decent state which, in the throes of an economic crisis, becomes seized 
by an authoritarian movement based on the rediscovery of a past national spirit. After disputed 
elections the state’s armed forces intervene and hand power over to the authoritarians, who begin 
remaking the state in their image and launch a propaganda campaign ascribing the nation’s woes 
to the presence of a long-suffering religious minority. As liberal states are free not to tolerate 
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outlaw states the state has fallen under sanction from the society of liberal states as well as many 
decent states and the economy begins to spiral. Digging their heels into their xenophobic rhetoric 
the regime begins a large-scale expropriation campaign against its scapegoated religious 
minority, leaving much of that population destitute and without income. Reporters and aid 
workers are denied access to those areas of the country, and while abuses are excused as military 
overzealousness what few reports do manage their way out of the country seem to indicate the 
early stages of an extermination campaign. Ad-hoc militias are founded to defend the religious 
minority, and as the state descends into anarchy millions of refugees begin making their way 
towards nearby liberal states that offer them shelter. Despite fierce condemnations from the 
society of liberal states and others on the world stage, the lack of substantive support to the 
rebels begins to wear thin on their leadership. In their desperation, the rebels turn to another 
outlaw state nearby which attempts to weaken the original state using the insurgency. In the 
liberal states where refugee flows are the heaviest there is increasing paranoia: under the aegis of 
the second outlaw state the religious insurgents have expelled others from their territory, thus 
escalating the atrocities on both sides. Wary of such a group of people being deposited on their 
doorstep many liberal states enact stricter immigration laws, further exacerbating the feeling of 
abandonment on the part of the insurgents as well as the amount of people trapped in the war 
zone in the first place. 
 Untrammeled migration and massive refugee flows pose the first and most immediate 
threat to liberal states created by humanitarian emergencies. Rawls did not doubt the ability of 
liberal ideals to persuade and take in new adherents to the cause, but he was likewise realistic 
when considering both the rate at which this happened as well as the necessity of keeping a firm 
majority of committed liberals, the reasonable citizens, in control while the assimilation 
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occurred. Thus, so long as a liberal state is committed to giving new migrants their liberty of 
conscience and of speech there exists the possibility that said state will be exposing itself to 
unreasonable comprehensive conceptions of the good. Even if the new members of the liberal 
state do not adhere to unreasonable doctrines there is the possibility that their presence will 
awaken other unreasonable elements within the liberal society. So long as there are people who 
feel fear towards others or a confusion at other beliefs there will be upsetting turns in liberal 
political culture when large numbers of other people enter into the country. Compounding this 
problem is the condition of these migrants, who likely have had to flee without much property, 
thus putting them on the lower rungs of the society into which they arrive. Unlike some of the 
other problems raised in this thesis, Rawls himself considered unchecked immigration to be 
something of a problem for liberal states, albeit one that would disappear in his realistic utopia 
(Rawls 2001: 8-9). Rawls felt that migration would not be an issue in the ideal world because the 
conditions under which it occurred would not exist. All else being equal, Rawls reasoned, people 
would prefer not to leave the places where they born and where they shared extensive ties to 
those around them. They would be even less likely to forsake a political community built from 
their own – something stipulated to be true of decent as well as liberal states. Some people would 
move for employment opportunities or other reasons, but we would not see the mass-migrations 
of the kind caused by widespread trauma and poverty. 
 The secondary threat to liberal states is to the idea of liberal leadership. That the liberal 
coalition will provide an example of peaceful commerce and cooperation is a crucial element of 
both Rawls and Kant’s theories of international relations. This leadership espouses universal 
human rights and calls for liberal governance, which is in turn achieved as states are brought 
closer into the orbit of the liberal peace. Since peace creates commerce, Rawls reasons, decent 
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states will be drawn to the society of liberal states (which will be commercially powerful, since it 
is peaceful) and in turn those states will either gradually liberalize or be at least tolerated by 
liberal states. However, imagine the perspective of a citizen in an outlaw state whose government 
is flagrantly violating human rights standards. Knowing that this is an issue on which liberal 
states prize their leadership one would naturally turn to those states, asking for help in dealing 
with the outlaw state’s excesses. Were one rebuffed in this situation it would be understandably 
devastating, both personally as well as to your view of the society of liberal states. Furthermore, 
when one considers the position of, for example, an opposition leader whose people are being 
massacred, it does not seem unreasonable to continue seeking help elsewhere. Perhaps there is a 
decent state sympathetic to your cause that will provide you with armaments on the condition of 
a say in government once you win. Perhaps there is an outlaw state who wishes you to become 
independent and will help you achieve that goal if it means weakening a rival and creating a 
puppet. Even if no massive refugee flow is created inaction on the part of liberal states is 
potentially devastating to their leadership role in the world order. 
 
The Necessity of Intervention  
 Working backwards from Rawls’s reasoning on how immigration was liable to disappear 
we see the necessity of humanitarian intervention to alleviate those same issues before they lead 
to a potentially crippling exodus of people. The use of force may not always be called for 
depending on the severity of the outlaw state’s infractions, but it is important to recognize the 
forceful dimension even benign aid efforts often require. For example, during Operation Provide 
Comfort, the UN-sanctioned US-led no-fly-zone over Iraqi Kurdistan and corresponding aid 
program after the Gulf War, very few Allied planes saw action against the chastened Iraqi Air 
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Force. The military presence was nonetheless crucial in order to allow successful aid delivery to 
the Kurdish refugees in the no-fly-zone (Global Security). Thus, in order to secure the rights of 
the oppressed in outlaw states the liberal states must take actions against the sovereign control 
which outlaw states possess over their territory. This also helps prevent the intervention of other, 
less savory actors who may have an unwarranted interest in the humanitarian situation. “Boots 
on the ground” are also required at least to a degree to ensure a smooth transition towards 
whatever government is desired after the humanitarian crisis. Liberal states should not expect 
humanitarian intervention to be a short process, for if they left the world with two outlaw states 
rather than one the enterprise would be useless. The rule of law and basic security must be 
provided as soon as possible. This is in keeping not just with stability as a precondition for just 
government, but also a simple fact of human conflict – that people tend to want revenge on those 
who have done them wrong. For this reason, it is not advisable to rely solely on those who were 
victimized by the outlaw state’s government to supervise the reconstruction effort. The eventual 
goal of a liberal intervention should be a mutually consented to governmental structure. It need 
not necessarily be liberal, but in order for at least a decent government to take hold in a 
traumatized former outlaw state the steadying hand of a third party is required.  
 A final note on the necessity of militant humanitarianism is on the need for stability “for 
the right reasons.” Rawls does not fetishize stability or the balance of power the way that 
Metternich or Bismarck did, for those were stabilities made up of competing despotisms. Rather, 
Rawls hopes that a liberal-led world would be stable because just systems established under its 
guidance would be naturally stable. Domestically Rawls explored this principle with the 
overlapping consensus which, due to its ambivalence about any comprehensive conception, is 
both stable and stable for the right reasons. A country that was 100% Muslim or Catholic or 
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Buddhist and promoted its respective creed would likely be stable as well, but that state would 
not be stable for the right reasons and thus does not qualify as a liberal state. Hyunseop Kim, a 
scholar exploring Rawls’s treatment of stability, notes that there are probably “cheaper” ways to 
oppose outlaw states than those Rawls suggests. For instance, liberal states could effectively 
bribe outlaw states by allowing them to participate in the liberal-decent international market in 
exchange for non-aggression (Kim 2015: 489). However, such bribery (which would strengthen 
the dictator by allowing them access to global finance) would not be achieving stability for the 
right reasons. Liberal states are not expected to be cheap in their protection of human rights 
because to do so would be to abandon their commitment to liberal governance, which requires 
strict adherence. Similarly, while closing one’s borders to asylum seekers provides a much easier 
solution to mass migration than actually dealing with the root cause, it smacks more of avoidance 
than of properly solving the issue (Kim 2015: 490). Furthermore, as evinced by Rawls’s own 
discussion of the lead-up to the Second World War, agreeing to negotiate and flatter aggressive 
dictators does nothing other than stave off the inevitable. Rawls’s characterization of outlaw 
states is of intractable agents of chaos, states that have total disregard for anything other than 
their own continued amassing of power. If true of outlaw states there is no recourse besides 
“changing their ways” as Rawls himself puts. Even aside from strategic stability concerns, a state 
which earns the outlaw moniker through actions against its own people or other states demands 
accountability from the international community, or else the perpetrators of those crimes would 
never have to face justice.    
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Chapter 3  
Legitimacy and the Use of Force 
 
Having demonstrated that the society of liberal states may be forced to defend its goals 
by force, the question now becomes whether the force described in the last chapter would be 
legitimate, particularly in the case of non-compliance by the state in which the actions take place. 
In answer, this chapter will be broken into three related parts: first, it will clarify the nature of 
legitimacy. Second, it will undertake a brief study of different theories of legitimacy, moving 
through traditional conceptions of sovereign authority in just war theory to the modern analytical 
and normative theories found in international relations theory before settling on a hybrid 
deliberative theory grounded in Habermas’s discourse ethics. Third, it will apply the deliberative 
theory to the society of liberal states, finding the narrow use of force in defense of the democratic 
peace legitimate as well as discussing the effect of legitimacy outside the society of liberal states. 
 
What is Legitimacy? 
 Broadly speaking, legitimacy refers to the voluntary submission of actors to legitimate 
authority. In order to understand the generation of legitimate authority I will first explain its 
function domestically before turning our focus outwards to international legitimacy. While states 
may, as described by Weber and discussed in Chapter 1, be defined by their monopoly on 
legitimate force, but within their territory it is the legitimacy, not the force, that induces 
compliance in their populace. When a citizen pays her taxes, it is not merely the threat of force 
that convinces her to do so, but rather the knowledge that, were force to be employed, it would 
be accepted by nearly everyone that the state was justified in using the force. Without such a 
distinction states would be little more than complex protection rackets, but while everyone 
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acknowledges the ability of both the state and the Mafia to extract money from people, only the 
state is accorded the authority to do so. This is a result of the legitimacy of the state system. 
 How does a system become legitimate? In Chapter 1 we discussed the “unitary order of 
violence” (Pierson 1996: 11) that emanates from a single source of legitimate authority. Weber 
posited the three following sources of legitimacy. Traditional authority derives its legitimacy 
from the continuation of habits and traditions, as in an aristocracy or a monarchy. Charismatic 
authority derives legitimacy from the charismatic leadership of a particular individual rather than 
any institutional authority, as in a dictatorship. Finally, rational-legal authority relies on the 
legitimating processes of a constitution and democratic governance (Weber 1978: 56-8). These 
concepts have become muddled in the years since Weber first proposed them. Iran, for instance, 
could be said to have charismatic authority from the Ayatollah but rational-legal authority from 
the President and while the US has rational-legal authority from the Constitution various 
presidents have benefited from charismatic authority. That said, they will suffice as explanation 
of the concept, which is that people need a reason to believe in the authority to which they are 
submitting beyond the mere threat of violence, or else it cannot be considered legitimate 
authority.  
 When one moves to the use of force internationally the question becomes more 
complicated, since there is no unitary source of authority as there is domestically. Since all actors 
arrive at their decisions more-or-less independently legitimacy takes on an important new 
dimension internationally because condemnation rarely has coercive weight behind it. 
Superpowers with little to materially fear from coercive measures will step back in the face of 
certain kinds of international condemnation, while outlaw regimes who plausibly face existential 
threats from international coercion regularly defy other kinds of condemnation. The key 
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difference is what the international community views as legitimate, and often what domestic 
audiences feel about the legitimacy of their state’s actions abroad as well.  
 This chapter is concerned with a narrower question of legitimacy: the use of force by a 
society of liberal nations in preemption of liberal-value-undermining catastrophe at home and the 
use of force in preventing or ameliorating similar catastrophes abroad. This thesis has made it 
plain that these problems exist uniquely in their relation to the society of liberal states’ goal of 
spreading liberal government to other states. Thus, the use of force must not only in and of itself 
be considered legitimate, the granting of this prerogative to liberal states to the exclusion of all 
others needs to be legitimate as well.  
 
Theories of Legitimacy 
 
The Classical “Authority” and Aquinas 
 Possession of “legitimate authority” is one of the seven conditions for the prosecution of 
a just war. In the beginning, the theorists taking up questions of just war vested this authority 
only in the sovereign themselves. This is a reflection, primarily, of two facts of Continental 
European life during the High Middle Ages and Renaissance: the gradual strengthening of 
central authority at the expense of the feudal aristocracy, and unchallenged faith in the divine 
right of kings. By understanding the way in which the times impacted early theories of 
legitimacy, and how those theories undergirded a worldview where sovereign (read: European) 
states had untrammeled access to “just” use of force despite their true intentions this section will 
attempt to provide a historical and systemic basis for differentiating the society of liberal states’s 
use of force from thinly veiled imperialism. In particular, this difference in intent, along with the 
balances afforded by liberal-democratic governance, will allow us to engage with those 
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(including Rawls and Kant) who deny that the non-defensive use of force can ever be considered 
legitimate.  
 Thomas Aquinas, one of the first rigorous examiners of just warfare, lived in a time of 
decentralized political authority and violence. As was alluded to in Chapter 1, the feudal system 
distributed authority through numerous hierarchies, each of which was frequently perceived as 
having legitimate authority over local areas. Because the de jure sovereign and other upper levels 
of the hierarchy relied on the cooperation of the lower levels to fill their armies and war chests, it 
was frequently the case that little could be done about conflicts throughout the system, regardless 
of their legitimacy. Although Aquinas was foremost a theologian and philosopher, he was also 
concerned with the temporal impact of his teachings, exercised through the Catholic Church. 
James Turner Johnson, himself a theologian and political theorist, identifies Aquinas’s more 
worldly concerns as control of certain actors; namely, that spiritual and non-sovereign authorities 
should be denied the recourse to armed conflict (Turner 2015: 25). Unlike Thomas Hobbes or 
other more straightforwardly authoritarian thinkers, Aquinas’s mistrust of non-sovereign 
authority stemmed not from the lower-level violence, but rather from his belief in the higher-
level’s responsibility and essentially moral nature. For Aquinas: 
“it does not pertain to a private person to declare war, because he can prosecute 
his rights at the tribunal of his superior; similarly, it does not pertain to a private 
person to summon the people together, which must be done in time of war. 
Rather, since the care of the commonwealth is entrusted to princes, it pertains to 
them to protect the commonwealth of the city or kingdom or province subject to 
them […] Hence it is said to princes at Psalm 82:4: ‘Deliver the poor and needy: 
rid them out of the hand of the wicked.’ Hence also Augustine says: ‘the natural 
order accommodated to the peace of mortal men requires that the authority to 
declare and counsel war should be vested in princes’” (Aquinas 2002: 240). 
 
The sovereign’s authority to declare war is thus explicitly bound up with the divine responsibility 
accorded to them by virtue of their position. Such authority cannot be wielded by private 
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persons, for whom the destruction of evil and protection of the innocent is outside the purview 
of. Furthermore, beyond the most immediate instances of self-defense, they cannot use force of 
arms in pursuit of personal justice, as there is a higher power to which appeal is always possible. 
For sovereigns, such disputes can rightfully be adjudicated by armed conflict as there is no 
immediately available higher power to hand down a judgement.  
Importantly for questions of legitimacy, Aquinas does not dispute the existence of ill-
intentioned sovereigns or the importance of right intention. He does, however, consider the 
position of sovereign to be imbued with unique responsibilities for the general welfare of people. 
In discussing obedience to unjust laws, Aquinas asserts that Christians have the duty to resist 
laws that call on them to violate God’s laws and, crucially, that this would constitute a 
“[command] by the ruler [which] is contrary to the purpose for which the ruler was appointed” 
(Aquinas 2002: 73-4). That is to say, were rulers primarily exercising their divinely-appointed 
roles correctly they would not stray from justice in administration or conflict. Aquinas’s 
arguments for the illegitimacy of unjust laws show his clear-sightedness about the nature of 
powers, but his unfailing belief that sovereigns are, generally speaking, just continues to be 
echoed in more permissive conceptions of sovereignty and the use of force. 
Grotius 
The Westphalian state system of sovereignty and non-intervention existed more or less 
unchanged from the eponymous treaty in 1648 to 1945, and since then it has only been eroded on 
the margins. The philosophical architect of this new sovereignty was Hugo Grotius, one of the 
first secular scholars of just war theory and one of the seminal figures in international law. 
Grotius ended up with many of the same conclusions as Aquinas where authority and war were 
concerned, but he famously couched them in reasoning that would stand even if God did not 
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exist. Grotius further differed from Aquinas in the manner in which he arrived at the authority of 
sovereign states, reasoning upward from the rights of individuals rather than downward from the 
sovereign’s contract with God. His reasoning that, “the power of the state was the result of 
collective agreement” (Grotius 2014) seems superficially identical to the later social contract 
theories of Hobbes and Locke. Grotius, however, considered the state less a protective or rights-
securing agreement than as an effort in mass-mobilization and control, writing that, “as the body 
is the common subject of sight, the eye the proper; so the common subject of supreme power of 
the state […] the proper subject is one or more persons, according to the laws and customs of 
each nation” (Grotius 2014). This is to say that while I see with my eyes, they themselves cannot 
see. In his metaphor the government is the eyes while the body is the collective polity that is 
acting through the government just as the entire body sees through the eyes (Tuck 2001). Thus, 
the sovereign is legitimate in defense of its people because the sovereign is an extension of those 
people and an instrument for the expression of their will. That said, just as we cannot will 
ourselves to see differently, Grotius did not believe that the people had that much to do with the 
will that their sovereign expressed on their behalf. In a section dedicated to “The opinion of 
those, who maintain that the Sovereign Power is always in the people, refuted, and their 
arguments answered” Grotius defends the right of unrestrained rule. Grotius held a personalized 
notion of the polities he described, one that could freely consent into agreements with itself about 
sovereign authority. Following from this, he argued that it was free to essentially enslave itself 
to, for example, a hereditary monarchy in exchange for safety and security (Tuck 2001). He did 
not deny that it was sometimes necessary for this group to change its nature, but he argued that 
would be less a transformation and more a suicide (Tuck 2001), confirming his absolutist view of 
sovereign authority. 
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It is clear from Grotius’s eye metaphor how he arrives at the legitimate state interest in 
self-defense (an attack on my eye being very much an attack on my body generally) but his 
theories regarding offensive wars have arguably had a larger, and more negative, impact than his 
absolutist sovereign authority. Grotius lists, among others, “wars of plunder […] Desire of a 
better soil – Discovery of things belonging to others […] Emperor’s pretensions to universal 
empire refuted – Pretensions of the Church” (Grotius 2014) as unjust causes. Even so, in addition 
to the usual just causes (self-defense, rectifying injustice) Grotius includes the possibility of 
expansionist wars against, essentially, non-European states: 
“Upon this principle [of punishing those who go against natural law] there can be 
no hesitation in pronouncing all wars to be just, that are made upon pirates, 
general robbers, and enemies of the human race. So far this opinion agrees with 
that of [Pope] Innocentius and others, who maintain all war to be lawful against 
those who have renounced the ties and law of nature. An opinion directly the 
reverse is held by Vitoria, Vasquez, Azorius, Molina, and others, who deem an 
aggression done to a prince, his government, or his subjects […] the only 
justifiable warrant for inflicting punishment” (Grotius 2014: 2, 20) 
 
Vitoria refers to Francisco de Vitoria, a 16th Century Spanish friar who argued that the 
European conquest of the Americas was an unjust war as the Native Americans were in 
possession of legitimate political authority. Grotius’s presupposition that there was no 
political authority of comparable sophistication to European states at the time is, of 
course, false, but the other prong of his argument has consequences for our theory of 
liberal intervention. Grotius, who views proper civil authority as an extension of natural 
law, argues that those living outside proper civil authority need their natural rights 
defended by a proper civil authority. Grotius does not assert any particular obligation in 
cases such as these, but rather that such a defense is just should one wish to undertake it. 
This created a basis for what was essentially an early theory of humanitarian intervention, 
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albeit as cover for colonialism (Kochi 2015: 120). Grotius himself had an enthusiasm for 
overseas possessions and had worked as a deputy for the Dutch East India Company. His 
theories were exploited by Europeans as justificatory “civilizing missions” for the next 
350 years. 	The Normative/Analytical Divide in Legitimacy Theories  
         Grotius and Aquinas’s arguments in favor of the sovereign as the only legitimate initiator 
of force were molded to a time when war between sovereigns was generally accepted. This 
understanding of war was unchallenged for centuries after the Treaty of Westphalia, and 
European states frequently fought each other with little consideration given to anything besides 
their immediate political interests. After decades of uninterrupted conflict during the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the first substantive norms against the legitimate 
prosecution of wars were established by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. For the next century, 
European states mostly contented themselves with colonial conquests before war broke out once 
more in 1914. The post-war order established by the Treaty of Versailles and the League of 
Nations was a second attempt at curtailing conflict, and led to the first instances of wars being 
considered illegitimate in the eyes of the international community with the Italo-Ethiopian and 
Sino-Japanese Wars. The inauguration of a substantive and inclusive world order post-Second 
World War gave rise to modern international relations theory, the subject of the next section of 
this thesis.  
         Grotius and Aquinas’s theories are normative theories of legitimacy, that is to say, they 
deal with the legitimacy of an action in a vacuum. Analytical legitimacy studies legitimacy in 
terms of compliance and submission, that is, why do other actors see an action as legitimate and 
permit it to happen, why do actors see a particular actor or process as conferring legitimacy to 
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the point that they will accept its ruling or opinion? Much of the work done studying the 
legitimate use of force internationally has been segregated along this normative/analytical divide, 
with analytical studies relying on empirical evidence and actor’s decisions and normative studies 
relying on political theory. In arguing for the legitimacy of the society of liberal states’s use of 
force, it is worth examining both, but eventually the divide will be bridged with a theory 
focusing on discursive reasoning and actor analysis, thus allowing both hypothetical judgments 
and an explanation for compliance. 
Modern Theories of Analytical Legitimacy 
 Ian Clark’s Legitimacy in International Society is a thorough and representative work of 
analytical legitimacy studies in that it studies the perceived legitimacy of actions and systems 
through time. Clark, admittedly narrow in focus, begins his argument with a claim there is 
“broad agreement” that standards of what is considered legitimate or not changes over time 
(Clark 2007: 13). How exactly these changes are occur and come to be accepted are thus the 
focus of his work. Clark is building on the traditional theories of legitimacy argued for by 
Martha Finnemore, who described legitimation struggles as a “marketplace of multilateral rules” 
wherein the leading international actors clash over who will be able to make the rules for 
everyone else (Finnemore 2005: 206). Finnemore’s analysis relies largely on realist assumptions 
about power and hegemony that, while superficially plausible, do not explain why actors who 
need not follow norms for purposes of power accretion ever follow the rule of others. Clark’s 
historical analysis, besides demonstrating the epistemological limitations of a purely analytical 
approach, give us an idea of what kinds of international structures states are inclined to follow. 
 Clark traces legitimate systems from right before the Peace of Westphalia but, having 
described the erosion of sovereign authority and its implications for the legitimate use of force, 
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this section will chiefly compare his analysis of the system inaugurated by the Treaty of 
Versailles and the post-1945 system. Clark describes Versailles as falling victim to a number of 
irreconcilable interests and goals, chiefly those dealing with membership within the new order. 
Self-determination of peoples, ostensibly the legitimating force behind the new order, was 
inconsistently or unfairly applied even to “victorious” European states at the same time that it 
was withheld entirely from the peoples that those states claimed as colonies. Italy, which had 
been promised Austro-Hungarian territory in the secret Treaty of London, was denied its claims 
on the basis that it violated ethnic and linguistic self-determination for the newly-independent 
Balkan states it would be absorbing (Clark 2007: 117-8). Japan, also an allied power, submitted a 
“Racial Equality Proposal” in keeping with the minority protections that were supposed to be a 
corollary to the self-determination clause. Japan’s proposal was widely mocked and ultimately 
dismissed, and presaged the total disregard for colonial rights that the treaty ultimately showed. 
One need hardly read the Treaty of Versailles’ content to know how it would turn out, given how 
negotiations proceeded. Having denied major players (the Soviet Union) in addition to Germany, 
a right to make decisions in shaping the future of international relations, and finally finished off 
by Wilson’s humiliating defeat in the attempted ratification of US membership, the Versailles 
order proved illegitimate. The reasons for this and the reasons that war came again are closely 
intertwined: the treaty failed because it could not find a way to satisfy the competing interests of 
great powers, leading them to seek extralegal means of settlement. It became seen as illegitimate 
in part because the absence of those powers seeking extralegal settlements left the League of 
Nations as a useless tool of international diplomacy that had, even before the Second World War, 
shown itself incapable of producing satisfying resolutions (Clark 2007: 128-30). 
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 Clark describes the post-1945 settlement as a “bipolar” settlement. This is not just in 
reference to the Cold War, but in reference to the ways that norms and rules were tightened to 
include human rights and liberal democracy, while enforcement was relaxed to accommodate the 
needs of the five victors of the war. The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the establishment of numerous bodies and organizations to promote its values showed that 
liberal norms and expectations would be passively endorsed, but major questions of international 
order would be left to the limited membership of the Security Council (Clark 2007: 146-7). The 
reality of the matter, as had been experienced during the trauma and inaction of the League of 
Nations during the interwar years, was that anything undertaken without the tacit support of all 
the great powers would not be able to accomplish anything. Thus, there was no loss to the 
architects of this new order to make such vetoes legitimate since they already existed in practice. 
Furthermore, the divorce of embedded liberalism as an aspirational domestic value and 
international stability externally allowed for the pursuit of both without alienating the large 
segments of the international community that adhered to non-democratic systems. Although 
Clark does explain the influence of norms on the proceedings, it is typical of analytical-historical 
writings that he focuses primarily on their influence on the actors at the time as opposed to 
making a value judgment about the norms and their effects themselves. Thus, we turn to the 
study of norms in international legitimacy. 
Normative Theories of Legitimacy 
 Richard Falk, in the introduction to Legality and Legitimacy, an edited volume discussing 
the tension and interplay between the two concepts, describes discourse over legitimate action 
thusly:  
“it provides a flexible alternative to the sort of binary assessements that have no options 
other than “legal” or “illegal.” This flexibility permits arguments about the comparative 
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claims of law, morality, and politics to be put forth in any setting of decision or policy 
formation, and yet sustains the relevance of international even in circumstances where the 
primary norm has been justifiably set aside.” (Falk 2012: 25). 
 
Falk mentions this in reference to the intervention in Kosovo, which was extra-legal but 
considered “legitimate” by NATO. In holding humanitarian intervention to be legitimate but not 
strictly legal, Falk seems to be affirming the kind of normative discourse that we have sought to 
legitimate the actions of the society of liberal states, but there is a crucial piece missing. As 
pointed out astutely by Corneliu Bjola, Falk fails to make any kind of actor distinction in terms 
of who possesses legitimacy, only which kinds of actions are considered legitimate (Bjola 2008: 
629). Indeed, one of his examples of a possible use of this “legitimate but illegal” intervention is 
the Cambodian-Vietnamese War that led to the fall of the Khmer Rouge. Although this resulted 
in the end of the Cambodian genocide, it was undertaken because Pol Pot’s government was 
supported by China and the United States. If Falk holds up the Kosovo protocol, which prohibits 
“territorial or economic” goals, as a good source of normative legitimacy but then admits that 
Vietnam’s accidental altruism would have been a legitimate justification then the door is open 
many kinds of abuses without any limitation on the types of actors that conduct them. 
 Andrew Hurrell, in an attempt to “square the circle,” makes a few useful observations 
about the normative character of legitimacy, as well an admirable but flawed attempt to give 
normative conceptions analytical weight. He contests the often-presupposed legitimacy of 
international institutions because their membership, in containing non-democratic states, 
ultimately poisons the outcome of deliberations within these organizations. Not only do 
international institutions rarely represent democratic interests, the provenance of the decision-
making itself – in coming from an undemocratic regime concerned chiefly with its own power – 
is tainted to the point that the ultimate decision of the body no longer matters (Hurrell 2005: 19-
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20). Hurrell ultimately accepts that democratic institutions provide a unique kind of legitimation 
on their own, but accepts some caveats in discussing the broader acceptance that such 
explanations may or may not receive. Hurrell notes that while the just war tradition is an 
inherited Euro-Christian set of values, its constant reiteration in the face of conflict has given it 
some legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. While  rational persuasion may not 
be universally achieved, the important point is the shared language with which it is attempted, so 
as to, at minimum, give all participants in the international system a chance to interpret events 
for themselves even if they were not included in the initial decision-making process (Hurrell 
2005: 24-5). Finally, in looking at analytical legitimacy Hurrell notes that the selectivity and 
expansionary nature of norm-enforcement has sapped the norms themselves of any legitimacy. 
Selectively, it appears to many actors on the world stage that the liberal democracies of the world 
speak of humanitarian intervention often, but only actually commit when there are national 
interests at play. This, combined with the expansionary nature of such calls – that is, there are 
more and more situations where such actions are called for over time – seems to indicate that talk 
of human rights and democracy is merely cover for a new imperialism (Hurrell 2005: 27-8). If 
any system is to be able to claim legitimacy over the use of force it must be able to apply its 
principles clearly and consistently. Hurrell gets most of the way to answering the manner in 
which this should be done simply by process of elimination, but fails to give any positive 
proscriptions of legitimating norms that can be applied to our liberal society. That said, his 
article raises several crucial problems ancillary to any formula for determining legitimacy: how 
can force be consistently enough applied such that it induces compliance from most members of 
the international community and how can the society of liberal states be sure that its arguments 
with other states share sufficient common values so as to communicate good will and legitimacy. 
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Merging Analysis and Norms: Deliberative Legitimacy 
 Concerned with the segregated nature of legitimacy studies, Corneliu Bjola set out to 
explicitly bridge the gap and develop a normatively sound method of force legitimation that at 
the same time could be applied to specific situations to test the legitimacy of actions, as well as 
giving stakeholders sufficient power to ensure compliance or submission. Bjola’s theory is 
grounded in Jürgen Habermas’s discourse theory of morality, a theory that bears certain 
similarities to Rawls’s own theory of public reason. Stripped to its essentials, Habermas argued 
that the basis for the legitimacy of the state was the continued participation of all in decision-
making by reasonable argument (Stanford). It is thus a proceduralist conception that derives its 
legitimacy from the continued discussion of all relevant stakeholders, and their ability to agree 
on an outcome absent any coercion. Bjola utilizes Habermas’s discourse theory to establish three 
rules for the legitimate use of force, but holds two concerns, fairness and tractability, in the 
background for assessing whether or not the theory is analytically realistic. Regarding fairness, 
Bjola employs H.L.A. Hart’s argument for “mutuality of freely consented restrictions,” i.e. that 
the actors taking part in the aforementioned reasonable discussion must not have been coerced 
into a position to exchange duties and benefits. Without this principle, the outcome of the 
discussion would be irrelevant because it was had under illegitimate circumstances (Bjola 2008: 
635). Second, the circumstances under which the group deliberates must be tractable, or 
relatively easy to bear. In this regard, Bjola argues for a legitimating structure that draws on both 
communitarian and cosmopolitan traditions of sovereignty, thus giving states their due as 
autonomous actors in a communitarian sense but not letting them slip by without upholding their 
extraterritorial duties in a cosmopolitan sense (Bjola 2008: 637). 
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 Having assessed the two principles by which a structure will achieve compliance, Bjola 
lays out his three validity claims for the legitimate use of force:  
1) “The facts supporting decisions regarding the use of force are truthful and complete, as 
informed by the best evidence available”  
2) “All affected parties must be allowed to participate in the argumentative discourse, and 
all participants should have equal rights to present an argument to challenge a validity 
claim”  
3) “Participating actors show genuine interest in using argumentative reasoning for 
reaching an understanding on the decision to use force” (Bjola 2008: 639).  
Using these three points Bjola arrives at a legitimating structure that allows groups of affected 
parties recourse to force, provided they adhere to principles of fairness and tractability in their 
selection of affected parties and their use of discursive reasoning to arrive at a decision. Bjola 
then walks us through possible scenarios with both normative and analytical legitimacy. If none 
of the validity claims are met, the use of force is, normatively, illegitimate. If participants meet 
the truth claims (1 and 3) then there is sufficient claim to legitimacy in the use of force. This is 
due to the fact that claim 1 shows that they have all the facts and claim 3 shows they have an 
interest in deliberative frameworks, even if the failure of 2 means they may not be able to meet it 
in this specific case, therefore there is sufficient grounds for a legitimate use of force (Bjola 
2008: 640-1). Thirdly and finally there is the situation where all three validity claims are met and 
there is subsequently a strong claim to legitimacy by the actors involved. Analytically speaking it 
is the speech acts constituent in the decision-making process which induce compliance, as the 
securing of validity claim 3 insures that the actors involved will have an honest and truthful 
discussion about the decision they are undertaking.  
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Deliberative Legitimacy and the society of liberal states 
 Now armed with a suitable theory of legitimacy we can apply it to the actions of the 
society of liberal states that were described in the previous chapter. In this section, two specific 
scenarios will be considered wherein the use of force by the society of liberal states is 
legitimized through a deliberative process in order to prove the abstract argument before turning 
to general critiques and objections.  
Terrorism 
  Let us assume that an international terrorist group based in the remote regions of a 
decent state has come into the possession of a nuclear weapon. The intelligence services of a 
liberal state discover this, as well as their plan to use the weapon to destroy a large city within 
the liberal state. The capability and intent are known and understood, but they do not know when 
the attack will occur or by what means the weapon will be smuggled into the country. The decent 
state in which the group resides is not complicit in the aims of the organization, but due to 
domestic political pressures and a hostile neighbor whom the organization also harasses they are 
unwilling to cooperate with the liberal state in apprehending the members. The liberal state takes 
this information to the other states in the society of liberal states who, after thorough discussion 
and examination of the facts, collectively approve of the use of force to prevent the nuclear 
device from being transported into the country. A small group of soldiers is secretly dispatched 
to the decent state and apprehends or kills the members of the terrorist organization, thus 
preventing the nuclear device from threatening the liberal state directly. Was such an action 
legitimate under the deliberative model just presented? 
   The first validity claim, that of full and complete truthful information, presents a 
problem. The extent to which intelligence regarding foreign adversaries can ever be truly judged 
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as “truthful” or “complete” is debatable, but for the sake of argument we will say that it was 
presented in its fullest and most truthful form. The speech acts which constitute the act of 
deliberation are more important for the legitimating process than the information itself, so the 
crucial question here is whether or not the other liberal states were provided with the same 
information obtained by the state directly under threat. Here again, we can assume that this was 
the case, for there is little reason for the threatened state to conceal anything, as the full picture is 
the most likely to yield approval for force that could potentially save hundreds of thousands of 
their citizens. This claim is met. The second validity claim, that all affected parties be allowed to 
discuss the use of force, has also been met. The decent state may have objected to the soldiers 
being dispatched to its territory, but the decent state is not the only affected party. Recall from 
Chapter 2 that the reason terrorism threatens the liberal project is not merely due to lives or 
property which is destroyed, it is the political consequences of that destruction. In theory, the 
liberal state could have waited until the weapon was actually on their soil to apprehend members 
of the group and neutralize the threat. However, this exponentially increases the risk to their 
citizens and also to the political system, which could not have withstood such an obvious 
undermining of the state’s responsibility to its citizens. In the face of this, the entire liberal 
society is made up of affected parties because the destruction done to their political structures 
and the eventual goals of the society would be irreparable were the use of force not undertaken. 
The third validity claim, that all participating actors show genuine interest in the deliberations, is 
harder to prove, but can be inferred as being met given the character of liberal democracies and 
the society of liberal states. Both Habermas, from whose work the legitimation conditions are 
drawn, and Rawls, from whose work the structure of the society of liberal states is drawn, place a 
premium on reasoned discussion for the creation of just governments. If such discussions are 
  
 
53 
essential for domestic justice then it stands to reason that the publics of liberal democracies 
would demand a similarly reasoned process when dealing with other states, particularly when the 
discussion involves potentially committing their armed forces to an action. The character of these 
states is what makes the legitimating process uniquely powerful in the context of the society of 
liberal states and we can consider the third validity claim met, thus giving a strong claim of 
legitimacy to the entire action.  
Humanitarian Intervention 
 An attempt is made on the life of a decent state’s president by an assassin who is 
identified as a member of a repressed ethnic minority. Identifying the group generally as 
responsible, the state launches a crackdown in their part of the country involving the use of the 
armed forces to move people into concentration camps for “protective custody.” Soon afterwards 
an earthquake occurs in that region. The government, after feebly attempting to repair damaged 
infrastructure, expels foreign journalists and aid organizations and abandons the region to the 
whim of the armed forces. What information does escape is rife with mass atrocity crimes as the 
armed forces, now abetted by citizen militias, accelerate the process of “protective custody” and 
begin wholesale killing and destruction of property. Pleas for assistance are considered by the 
states of the society of liberal states, who have been calling for an end to repression and the 
introduction of more just and representative government in the state for years. After deliberation, 
a multinational force is dispatched to the state in question. After a short period of engagement 
with the liberal task forces the state’s armed force’s largely retreat from the minority area of the 
country. The region, now de-facto independent under the auspices of liberal militaries, is opened 
to international aid organizations and foreign infrastructure investment. Were the actions of the 
liberal states justified? 
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 As with the terrorism case, the question of truthful and complete information is difficult 
to address. The existence of a humanitarian emergency seems highly likely, but the obfuscation 
and denials of the decent state call the nature of the crisis into question. The issue of protective 
custody seems to indicate malicious intent, but the death toll could be more a result of the 
earthquake then the armed forces. Finally, however, the expulsion of foreign journalists and aid 
organizations is telling – given the information available it seems that the decent state harbors 
malicious intent towards the ethnic minority. Again, as with the terrorism case, the salient 
question for the deliberative process is more equal information than truthful. The second 
condition of affected parties is similar. The decent state has nominal jurisdiction within its 
borders, but at the point when it is deliberately perpetrating atrocities its sovereignty, predicated 
on securing goods for all of its citizens, is no longer inviolate. In order to secure those goods, it 
requires outside intervention, and the liberal states are uniquely affected by this problem due to 
their role in promoting liberalism around the world. Having previously called for more just 
government and an end to ethnic discrimination, the society of liberal states – and liberalism 
itself – risks losing legitimacy in the eyes of the ethnic minority and liberal opposition within the 
decent state. Thus, for its political goals the society of liberal states can be considered an affected 
party when coming to the table to deliberate the use of force. The second condition is met. The 
third condition is met for the same reasons as the terrorism case. The society of liberal states has 
a strong claim to legitimacy in this use of force. 
Legitimacy and the Character of States 
 Having considered specific instances, I will now turn to the behavior of the society of 
liberal states generally. It would be a fair criticism to say that the two examples above were 
cherry-picked for their obviousness and the by-the-book attitude of the states involved. There is 
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ample reason to believe, however, that the character of liberal states operating together in a 
society of the kind presumed by Rawls or Kant will cause them to treat Bjola’s deliberative 
legitimacy theory as a guide, rather than a test. That is, the society of liberal states will limit 
itself to uses of force that can be legitimately undertaken using the deliberative model. 
Furthermore, I will argue that the rigorous discourse required in order to legitimately use force 
excludes non-liberal states from doing so.  
 Describing the character of liberal states in The Law of Peoples Rawls comments that, 
“the necessary (political) virtues are those of political cooperation, such as a sense of fairness 
and tolerance and a willingness to meet others half-way” (Rawls 2001: 15). That is, in order for a 
liberal state to function its citizens must possess virtues of political cooperation. Any state with a 
sustainable liberal structure can thus be assumed to possess those virtues in a majority of its 
populace, or else the liberal institutions in the state would not function. Rawls’s description of 
the origins of the democratic peace and, by extension, the society of liberal states itself shed 
further light on these virtues and their presence in the inter-state discourse of liberal 
democracies. The first reason for democratic peace is that liberal democracies are “satisfied” 
societies when it comes to the basic goods and their distribution amongst their citizens. The 
second reason is the ideal of public reason and its place in liberal societies. Because liberal 
democracies are founded on the idea of rigorous argumentation and public justification, as well 
as transparency and accountability, their first impulse when dealing with other states will be one 
of dialogue. The reason that liberal states come together in the society of liberal states in the first 
place is because they have no desire for aggression, instead preferring reasoned dialogue with 
one another (Rawls 2001: 49-50). This desire for reasoned dialogue is ingrained in their 
institutions and thus the behavior of the citizens conducting state business abroad and with other 
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states. This automatically satisfies the third validity condition of deliberative legitimacy because 
liberal democratic states are constitutionally and characteristically predisposed to favor the kind 
of argumentation required. The desire to fully execute the ideals of public reason satisfy the first 
legitimacy condition because “the public reason of free and equal people [is] debating their 
mutual relations as peoples” (Rawls 2001: 55). Since public reason precludes any comprehensive 
doctrine of truth predicated on subjective understandings offered by religion or ideology, a 
reasoned debate requires full objective knowledge of a given situation in order to have a 
reasoned argument regarding it. This establishes the interest in gaining full knowledge of a case 
regarding the use of force as an interest of liberal states. Finally, the political threats posed by the 
two cases described in Chapter 2 establishes all members of the society of liberal states as 
affected parties for the purposes of the second validity condition. Since members of the society 
are all working toward the gradual expansion of liberal governance by good example, their 
forceful actions in defense of liberal democracy in any single state are a defense of their 
collective sovereignty over their political systems.  
The reasons above lay out the argument for deliberative legitimacy as more than a mere 
test for the legitimate use of force, but as guiding principles to which the society of liberal states 
would naturally and willingly adhere should it undertake forceful action in any circumstance. 
Furthermore, even accepting that liberal states occasionally (or even frequently) fail to live up to 
Rawls’s “realistic utopia” of liberal governance by public reason, it is in the self-interest of 
liberal states to defend the actions of the society of liberal states as legitimate. If one accepts, as 
Rawls and this thesis do, that the implicit goal or endpoint of the society of liberal states is the 
spread of liberal governance by good example, deviation from the otherwise pacifistic nature of 
the society must be defended through a rigorous legitimation process. Without such a process, 
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the image of a liberal society as an aspirational organization would be shattered, and be just as 
self-defeating to the example of liberal governance as allowing humanitarian disasters or 
catastrophic acts of terror to occur. 
 In contrast to the ability and desire of liberal states to follow the rules for rational uses of 
force, decent (and certainly burdened and outlaw states) are unable to for two reasons. First, they 
are characteristically unable to because their governmental structures do not conform to norms of 
liberal governance that allow for “legitimate” decisions to be made, thus the provenance of their 
decisions is tainted. Secondly, the liberal states are considered “affected parties” for the purposes 
of the second validity claim because of the scale of the political threat that inaction presents. For 
a similarly threatened decent, burdened, or outlaw state the stakes are much lower and the 
security dilemmas presented by liberal-democratic governance do not exist.  
 Recall Andrew Hurrell’s description of the hierarchical nature of international decision-
making: because the state’s actions are themselves representative of the will of its governing 
bodies, those bodies must be representative in order for the decision to be fully democratic. The 
last two validity claims for a legitimate use of force deal explicitly with access to and an interest 
in “argumentative reasoning.” This is a crucial point in Bjola’s theory: 
“Unwillingness to include other relevant actors in the debate and refusal to engage 
in argumentative reasoning only serve to discredit claims made on that basis, 
because it clearly demonstrates the intent to pursue an ideological agenda, which 
is shaped by subjective considerations and hence, largely divorced from an 
intersubjectively-defined social reality” (Bjola 2008: 640).    
 
Discussing the actions of the society of liberal states we have almost exclusively deployed 
Bjola’s legitimacy tests internationally, so the discourse and argumentation is between states and 
their representatives. However, it is clear from the argument presented above that this can also be 
used domestically, and thus to trace from their origin the legitimacy of decisions to use force. To 
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get a feel for this process let us reintroduce Rawls’s prototypical decent state, Kazanistan. In 
Kazanistan all are basically equal, in the sense that there is not state-sponsored discrimination 
against anyone in particular. That said, Islam clearly informs the discussions had within the state 
and only Muslims are allowed to seek political office. In the Idea of Public Reason, Rawls 
contends that democratic governance and the use of public reason arises from “a relation of 
citizens within the basic structure of society, a structure we enter only by birth and exit only by 
death; and second, it is a relation of free and equal citizens who exercise ultimate political power 
as a collective body” (Rawls 2001: 136). While Kazanistan might arrive at decisions through free 
and equal citizens exercising their collective political power, those citizens arrive at that power 
by virtue of their belief in Islam, not by virtue of birth into a system of free and equal people. 
Furthermore, presuming, as Rawls does, that Kazanistan has people of other religions within its 
borders who are considered “citizens” in the sense of their passports, if not their rights, then 
political decisions clearly run afoul of public reason. The decision-making classes of Kazanistan 
are comprised entirely of Muslims, and Islam directly informs the goals of the state. Since it 
informs the goals of the state and all the decision-makers share in this background, discourse 
around those decisions is necessarily influenced by a subjective worldview that cannot be 
interpreted without accepting that same set of premises.  
 Even if there were no citizens of other faiths in Kazanistan and every single citizen did 
understand method by which the decision to use force was made the decision would still need to 
be explained to the other affected parties. Were Kazanistan attacked directly and there were truly 
no other actors involved then such a decision would be valid. This is one of the reasons that 
deliberative legitimacy does not deprive states of their right to self-defense: when one is being 
attacked there is no dispute over who the affected parties conducting the discussion are. When 
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conducting a humanitarian intervention this is not possible because there are other parties 
involved; if the humanitarian imperative is justified using Islamic law then it is not readily 
understandable to the other affected parties, be they other states in the region or the society of 
liberal states. It is not a public reason that can be argued regardless of social context and it is thus 
inadmissible to the legitimacy discussion, precluding Kazanistan and similarly hierarchical 
decent states from undertaking the use of force outside of self-defense. 
 What if the leaders of Kazanistan did have a public reason? What if they were so 
interested in using force that they restricted themselves to public reasons when justifying their 
actions? This would still be invalid and illegitimate, because they still exclude non-Muslims 
from the decision-making process. Even if the argument is believable for the rest of their citizens 
and the other affected states, they did not get a chance to challenge the validity of the action, thus 
failing the second validity claim. Bjola himself admits that meeting the first and third validity 
claims is sufficient to give a use of force legitimacy, but the third claim – the genuine interest in 
reasoned argumentation – cannot be met by a state that consciously shuts people out of the 
argument and decision. A state that limits access to the halls of power based on belief clearly 
demonstrates a lack of interest in publicly reasoned argumentation and any behavior to the 
contrary internationally (such as using a publicly understood argument to achieve strategic or 
political goals) is just cover for their true intentions. Constitutionally, decent and other non-
liberal states cannot legitimately use force outside of self-defense because of their disinterest in 
argumentative reasoning and their exclusionary political practices.  
 Superficially such an exclusion seems ridiculous. If the leaders of Kazanistan were going 
to intervene in, say, a humanitarian emergency for the very same reasons that liberal states would 
have than what is the issue? The issue is twofold and has to do with both the importance of 
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procedural legitimacy and the prior requirement of stability before a just system can flourish. 
Regarding procedural legitimacy, strict limitations are required such that the language used to 
justify the use of force is not misappropriated by decent or other actors that merely claim to be 
acting under a guise of defense or humanitarianism. Humanitarianism has often been used as 
cover for aggressive action against other states, indeed it was Hitler’s use of such pretenses that 
led to the exclusion of a right to humanitarian intervention from the post-WW2 order (Goodman 
2006: 108-10). If liberal states are to rely on speech acts for their legitimation procedures, then 
the procedure through which such speech acts are transformed into actions must be inviolate. 
The ability of Kazanistan to act unilaterally also has bearing on international stability, which 
Rawls considers key to the development of a just society. The hierarchy of needs will always 
dictate that food, shelter, and safety come before civil and political rights. Thus, it is necessary 
for the global situation to be as a stable as possible if liberal governance is to spread (Beitz 2000: 
688-9). Were states allowed to unilaterally decide when to intervene the role of stability in 
dictating how and why the intervention is undertaken would fall by the wayside. Humanitarian 
emergencies need to be considered in a deliberative manner if all the relevant factors are to be 
weighed; Kazanistan, in lacking the faculties to fully participate in the deliberative process 
cannot be considered a legitimate actor even for the right reasons. 
 That said, this does not preclude the acceptance of or participation in action altogether. 
Earlier the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia was described as “legitimate but illegal” and, 
like vigilantism, we (or the liberal states) may say that the right outcome was achieved but 
nevertheless condemn the action itself. Furthermore, like with vigilantism, we can recognize the 
necessity of its prohibition while simultaneously exonerating those who commit it when all the 
facts are presented before us.  
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 The second reason for non-liberal states’ illegitimacy is their questionable status as 
affected parties. The society of liberal states’s position as such is derived from the threat that 
humanitarian emergencies and terrorism pose to the political project of expanding liberal 
governance. Decent states have no similar position because they are not a part of that project and 
the rights afforded to their citizens are divorced from their political identity. Because they exist 
to give voice to ethnic or otherwise finite groups, the curbing of civil liberties to fight terrorism, 
for instance, does not pose an existential threat to the political life of the state. This distinction is 
important when considering the proportionality of a response – the existential threat to the liberal 
project posed by a terrorist group with a nuclear weapon requires a swift and forceful response, 
even if it violates another state’s sovereignty in the process. By contrast the same threat being 
made to a decent state poses a direct threat to the lives of its citizens but not to the state itself. 
The principle of self-defense might mean limited forceful action is justified if the threat is truly 
dire, but not to the degree which it is called for on behalf of liberal states.  
Deliberative Legitimacy and Compliance 
 The discussions of legitimacy in this thesis are primarily concerned with the normative 
legitimacy of actions, but it is worth acknowledging, as Rawls seeks to with his “realistic 
utopia,” that a theory which is totally unachievable is not worth much. In the world today states 
that could be considered “liberal” are dominant economically, militarily, and culturally to an 
extent that induces compliance on its own. However, considering the perceived legitimacy of 
Bjola’s deliberative processes in such a world would be missing the point. Not only have we 
discussed the hollowness of such “great-power legitimacy” as mere coercion, it defeats the 
purpose of a procedural theory to say that only from a position of strength will the procedure be 
taken seriously. Thus, structural reasons for compliance on the part of non-liberal states must be 
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provided. Fortunately, there is ample reason to believe that a society of liberal states following a 
deliberative process of force legitimation would induce broad compliance in the international 
community. The argument for such compliance consists of two intertwined points: first, the 
deliberative process provides checks against the selfish and politically motivated concerns that 
normally sap legitimacy. Second, the consistent repetition of processes over time leads to an 
acceptance of those processes. 
 Consider first the reasons that the use of force by liberal states is often viewed as 
illegitimate. Frequently it is due to a fundamental mistrust of these states and their motives. 
While there are a few outlaw states whose position is either to obfuscate or deny humanitarian 
disasters, or to insist that mass-atrocity crimes are within the legitimate purview of a sovereign 
state, the majority of states are accepting of human rights standards when sufficiently convinced 
that it is not cover for imperialism. For instance, talk of human rights and democratic spread was 
roundly dismissed in the lead up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq because many were convinced, as 
Nelson Mandela stated at the time, that “All [President Bush] wants is Iraqi oil” (The Guardian 
2003). Mandela had previously been supportive of Coalition forces in Afghanistan, but the fact 
that the US acted unilaterally and without sufficient evidence in Iraq led to not just to that 
conflict being perceived as illegitimate, but also the tainting of the language used to justify it.  
 Conditions of inclusion within the deliberative process are key to understanding why a 
society of liberal states would be more effective at curtailing overreaches like Iraq. In a system 
that emphasizes universal participation such as the UN General Assembly or a mostly liberal but 
de jure apolitical body like NATO the objections of other states do not count for much. Failure to 
secure UN General Assembly or Security Council approval for the Iraq War was written off as 
being due to anti-Americanism in the GA and the vetoes of Russia and China in the Security 
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Council. Thus, the illegality of the war had been due to the machinations of illiberal states and 
did not actually prove anything about the character of the war. Opposition from NATO allies like 
France and Germany was dismissed as irrelevant, as the Iraq conflict was outside of NATO’s 
purview of collective North-Atlantic defense. Were the case for war being made to a society of 
liberal states whose explicit goal the protection and encouragement of liberal government such 
opposition could not be swept under the rug as easily. Opposition based on the eroding of liberal 
legitimacy would have to be taken seriously as to not do so would be to contradict the goals of 
the very organization undertaking deliberations. Likewise, the failure to authorize force could not 
be attributed to nefarious despotisms and could thus not be written off as mere ideological 
disagreement. The character of deliberations on force changes substantially within an explicitly 
political organization of the kind envisioned by Rawls, and this leads to much more serious 
consideration of opposition by states that have aggressive impulses such as those that drove the 
US into Iraq. 
 The result of these checks on individual state behavior is that non-liberal states are much 
more likely to take the actions of such a body seriously. Any use of force approved by the liberal 
states would have to involved seeing all the facts of the case and rigorously debating the correct 
response before finally settling on the use of force. Knowing that such a discussion had been had 
it would be harder to oppose liberal goals as being cover for expansionism, and any attempt to do 
so would likely come from states who felt themselves ideologically incompatible with liberalism, 
and thus incapable of being persuaded by liberal public reasons in any case.  
 This is not to say that every state would immediately comply with liberal states’ use of 
force merely because they had debated the issue beforehand. Rather, it is the consistent results 
that the deliberative method is able to achieve over time that induce compliance among non-
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liberal states. Hurrell, in describing language used to justify the use of force, appeals to Michael 
Walzer’s description of the “moral reality” of war. Because those caught up in conflict are not 
just victims but active participants there has been much time and effort devoted to uncovering 
moral arguments regarding it. Over time the reiteration of a certain subset of these arguments has 
led to an accepted language with which wars are justified (Walzer 2015: 15). The problem with 
the existing “moral reality” is that it can be twisted to suit the needs of nearly anyone, descended 
as it is from schools of thought (like Grotius and Aquinas) that relied almost entirely on intent 
for its justification. Deliberative legitimacy provides a moral reality where not just language but 
an actual process can be used to test for legitimacy. This solves two issues: first, partisans of 
absolute sovereignty are no longer able to allege ill-intent on the part of the liberal states without 
impugning the democratic process more generally, a process which is already a well-entrenched 
norm in international society. Second, the consistency with which force is applied will naturally 
generate legitimacy the same way that Weber described it as being generated by tradition. That 
is, states get used to the language and norms used to justify actions until those actions become 
the status quo. At this point, states will tend to respect and comply with the actions of liberal 
states more often than not.  
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Chapter 4 
Objections and Responses 
 
The previous chapter provided an argument as to how a society of liberal-democratic 
states can, through discourse and collective decision making, address threats to the liberal project 
with force. Furthermore, it argued that non-liberal states were, due to their internal political 
processes, unable to legitimately use force in a similar manner and were limited to narrowly 
construed self-defense. Objections to the exclusionary nature of the liberal society and its uses of 
legitimate force were dealt with in the discussion of Kazanistan in the last Chapter, but there are 
more reasons to take issue with a society of liberal states using force abroad than just the 
exclusion of decent states. This chapter will address three primary objections to the liberal 
society’s forceful reactions, dealing with the goals and construction of the liberal society itself, 
as well as problems more narrowly associated with its use of force. First, this chapter will 
address the historic use of democratic ideals as a mask for imperialism, and the possibility that 
the liberal project of expanding liberal governance is intrinsically imperialist and coercive. 
Second, issues with democratic militarism and the tendency of liberal societies who frequently 
use force abroad to become more autocratic will be investigated. Third, the recourse to violence 
itself and whether or not this signals an illegitimacy or a loss of authority on the part of liberal 
democracies and liberal ideals generally will be interrogated.  
 
Democracy as Imperialism 
 
Liberal Democracy and Colonialism 
Chapter 3 described briefly how Hugo Grotius’s theory of sovereign authority based on a 
political organization aimed at representing the will of the people was used to further colonial 
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expansion. Indigenous political structures were considered illegitimate and thus not possessed of 
the sovereign authority which European states could claim. Thus, under Grotius’s view, the 
expansion of European authority to areas where such structures predominated was actually 
bringing areas of anarchy into line with the principles of natural law and governance supposedly 
espoused by European states. In reality the indigenous peoples of the Americas, Africa, and Asia 
had developed sophisticated governments whose only real fault was that they could not match 
European technology. That outright conquest was covered up by an expansion of “correct” 
political authority was bad enough, but democracy and liberal ideals specifically have been used 
to veil colonialist ventures as well.  
Liberal democracy’s history of providing a smokescreen for colonialism cannot be 
ignored, particularly when the society of liberal states attempts to justify its uses of force to the 
international community. That said, the danger of such language being used to justify outright 
plunder or settler colonialism has probably passed, as wars of conquest or exploitation are now 
roundly condemned by the international community. Updated and nuanced forms of such 
behavior are not out of the question, however. Given recent history, it is easy to conceive of a 
liberal intervention ostensibly for humanitarian purposes that turns into an exploitative venture. 
The deliberative legitimation process described in Chapter 3 ensures the initial use of force is 
legitimate, but recent history has shown that even if the intention is right the follow-through can 
still lead to abuses and exploitation. Consider, for instance, a humanitarian intervention made to 
stop a genocide. The use of force by the society of liberal states meets all three conditions of a 
legitimate action and is widely perceived as such by the international community. As has been 
discussed, however, it is usually not sufficient for liberal forces to merely stop the genocide. 
States that find themselves in such dire straits normally require an extensive process of healing 
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and rebuilding, and it is conceivable that forces from liberal states would need to remain for 
some time as this process gets off the ground. Apart from the optical problems of what is 
essentially an occupation and the problems accompanying such a presence there are 
opportunities for exploitative behavior even as liberal states genuinely try and aid the state in 
question. Given recent history, particularly the experience of the United States in Iraq, it is easy 
to see that preferential treatment could be given to contractors from liberal states during the 
reconstruction process. The profit that companies could reap from an otherwise humanitarian 
project may cast such an intervention, and the human rights violations upon which its legitimacy 
is built, as a neocolonial attack. Exploitation of this nature does not need to be as obvious as 
resource extraction or workforce mobilization, even the legitimate work of consultants on 
rebuilding key infrastructure or governmental structures could be as exploitative if such actions 
lead to great profit on the part of the liberal states.  
Specifically, on the example of Iraq and the American private sector’s resulting profit, it 
can be fairly argued that, when the intervention starts from an unjust and illegitimate premise, it 
is far more likely to be exploited for private gain. Chapter 3 addressed why such oversteps are 
unlikely to occur when subjected to a rigorous deliberative legitimating process, and thus we can 
assume that interventions would occur only in good faith. That said, projects started in good faith 
can still become corrupted once undertaken, but there are structural reasons why a legitimate 
intervention by the society of liberal states would not be subject to such pressures.  
First, in keeping with the third legitimacy condition (genuine interest in the deliberation) 
it must be assumed that any legitimate action was undertaken because the states in the liberal 
society felt that it met the other conditions. There is little reason to think that states putting lives 
on the line to stop a humanitarian disaster would want to get something out of it other than an 
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end to the crimes and a reconstituted state capable of providing for its people. If they did, they 
would not have had a legitimate interest in the deliberative process because the deliberative 
process is concerned with whether or not force is required to stop the humanitarian emergency. 
Even if one assumes for the sake of argument that there are countries within the society of liberal 
states willing to use reconstruction efforts to enrich their citizens there is no reason to think that 
other states would allow it. If this one state is the only one that does not concern itself with the 
humanitarian project, the other states will reject their attempts to profit from the reconstruction 
and limit involvement to non-profits or government entities. This is not to say that national 
interests do not exist at all but rather that liberal states would hopefully see the danger in 
allowing profit-seeking during a humanitarian mission. Even if this remains strictly secondary in 
priority there is still the chance that humanitarianism in other more borderline cases could just be 
a guise under which profit is extracted. However we can in theory assume that all the 
participating states are profit motivated and although I feel this is a bad faith objection because it 
contradicts the premise of liberal foreign policy being the spread liberal values and not profit, the 
assumption that liberal democracies are nonetheless competitive allows us to subject their profit-
seeking to the logic of competition. Because the game of extracting profit is zero-sum (i.e. if one 
state gets a mining concession or employs a certain amount of people others will not) with 
multiple competitors, they will restrict the participation of any profit-seeking entities, thus 
limiting it to non-profit or government entities in order to keep anyone from benefitting, leaving 
us the same scenario as with pure intentions. If they truly cared about profit more than anything, 
there would be cooperative exploitation, but if this is the case than a key premise of the society 
of liberal states is false, and thus their colonialism is not a problem for the liberal project. Rawls 
himself notes in the Law of Peoples that “[an] assumption here is that the larger nations with the 
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wealthier economies will not attempt to monopolize the market, or to conspire to form a cartel, 
or to act as an oligopoly” (Rawls 2001: 43). If the liberal states are willing to impose artificial 
market controls after an intervention then they would presumably be willing to do so generally 
speaking. Therein lies the ultimate response to this objection, which is that liberal states are 
creatures of the market and competition, and would not take steps to limit either of those things 
abroad unless it was in the interest of further liberal developments.       
Finally, if we assume that liberal governments generally act in good faith but private 
entities may not, we can turn to Rawls’s own belief in the strict control of money in politics as a 
prerequisite for true liberal governance. This limits the ability of private entities to bend 
government to their will and keeps the exploitation from happening. If the people of a liberal 
state themselves are intent on exploitation than the state is no longer liberal, as it harbors 
aggressive designs towards other states. 
Liberal Democracy as an Imperialist Project 
 Outright exploitation is not the only problem for liberal states’ use of force. It can be 
argued that the extension of liberal values is really an imposition of liberal values. This applies 
more obviously to instances of post-conflict reconstruction wherein liberal structures are 
implemented, but can be taken as a critique of the liberal project generally. While the goal of 
liberal foreign policy is to promote liberal governance, it must also respect reasonable pluralism 
by tolerating most non-liberal states. Non-liberal states are allowed some latitude for self-
determination, and as long as they respect the basic principles human rights of their citizens they 
should be left alone by the liberal states. The project of expanding liberal views can be read as 
imperialist if one thinks that the promotion of such views infringes on the self-determination of 
decent states that have elected to, for instance, privilege one religion or ideology over the 
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political rights of their citizens. In the real world, this argument is often deployed against 
interactions between liberal and non-liberal states where liberal states exact some kind of 
political price for the interaction. For instance, if a liberal state conditions aid or other economic 
activity on political reform.  
Unfortunately, such agreements are not only common, they are counterproductive to the 
liberal project, as they are often weaponized by politicians seeking to undermine institutions, like 
the World Bank or International Monetary Fund, that seek to promote liberal governance. Ideally 
a society of liberal states organized along Rawlsian lines would reject such behavior as 
antithetical to the goal of spreading liberal governance by example. Furthermore, as liberal states 
are premised on a mutual agreement between citizens, a liberal government obtained through 
imposition would not be a true liberal state, and the avenues for governmental change afforded 
by liberalism mean that the citizens of such a state would quickly make it non-liberal again. 
 More of an issue for fears of liberal imperialism is the role of liberal states in 
reconstructing states that have required intervention. If one accepts that all people have a right to 
self-determination, even if that means adopting a non-liberal government, then liberal states 
playing an active role in restructuring states that have suffered from humanitarian disasters raises 
the prospect of potentially contradicting that self-determination. The character and structure of 
liberal states again provides a check against this possibility, however. First, it is crucial to 
recognize the situation of the states demanding a forceful response. These are states which 
deliberately deprive their own citizens of fundamental rights, thus creating a humanitarian 
emergency demanding an intervention by the society of liberal states. States responsible for such 
an emergency cannot be considered “well-ordered” in the Rawlsian sense of respecting human 
rights. Thus, when dealing with the outlaw states that perpetrate atrocities the goal of liberal 
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states must be to reestablish a well-ordered society. In Rawls’s own discussion of humanitarian 
intervention, he makes it clear that, “the enemy’s people are not to be held as slaves or serfs after 
surrender, or denied in due time their full liberties” (Rawls 2001: 98). When restored to their full 
liberties the people of the state are entitled to reenter the international community as a non-
liberal but decent state if that is what they want. While liberal states are the only ones entitled to 
initiate humanitarian intervention because of their ability to legitimize such action through 
deliberation, they are not entitled to recreate the state in question in their image against the will 
of its citizens. Likewise, decent states themselves are precluded from such intervention because 
their preference for a specific notion of the good life would lead them to construct a similar 
government in the state where they intervened. Liberal states, at least in ideal theory, are 
committed to the principles of free and open debate and would construct liberal processes for the 
determination of a well-ordered government but not insist on a liberal outcome to those 
processes. 
 
The Use of Force and Liberalism at Home 
 Debates about the character of liberal states operating abroad often center on their actions 
overseas in a vacuum: does liberalism have an inherent disposition towards imperialism? Does 
the promotion of liberal values abroad violate principles of liberal tolerance? Less often 
examined is the corrosive influence that actions abroad often have on liberal values domestically. 
Turning to non-ideal theory and the possibility of public corruption and crime, this section will 
address the consequences of conflict abroad for liberal states. 
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War and Public Corruption 
 Many theories of international relations take Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian 
War as their starting point. Exiled from Athens for a failed military action, it has been argued 
that Thucydides (like Plato after the trial of Socrates) was molded into an enemy of democracy 
by its treatment of him. The History of the Peloponnesian War is not unbiased history, but its 
true lessons lie not in the dangers of democracy itself, but rather in the dangers that unwise 
military adventurism can have for democracy. Alan Gilbert, a scholar of democratic theory, 
argues that the trajectory of Athens from hubris to empire to overextension to eventual defeat 
closely mirrors that of the United States from the beginning of the Cold War through Vietnam. 
The Athenian Empire had its beginnings in the defeat of the Persians at the Battle of Salamis, 
where the Persian navy was annihilated by that of Athens, thus preventing an invasion of Greece. 
The Athenians, who had been convinced to build ships for defense, were now left with the most 
powerful navy in the region. Rather than disband the fleet or the defensive league into which 
many Aegean cities had entered, the Athenians used their ships to extract tribute from their allies 
in order to pay upkeep on the fleet. Pericles’s funeral oration for fallen Athenians in the first 
years of the war with Sparta squarely places “Athenian Greatness” at the feet of their defeat of 
the Persians (Gilbert 1999: 155-6). That is to say, because Athens had defended Greece they 
were justified in continuing their exploitation of their former allies, even though by this point it 
had led to war with Sparta. Because Sparta was a land power and Athens a sea power there were 
few decisive engagements in the first fifteen of what would become a twenty-seven-year affair. 
Facing problems domestically after so many years of frustration a militarist faction came to 
power in the Athenian assembly and devised an expedition against democratic (but Spartan-
allied) Syracuse using nearly the entire Athenian military. The Syracuse expedition was a 
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disaster resulting in the total destruction of the Athenian fleet and oligarchic factions took hold 
shortly thereafter, leading to the eventual downfall of Athenian democracy after the final defeat. 
 Gilbert does not attempt to analogize too closely between specific events and persons, but 
even without outside analysis it is easy to see reflections of the American victory in the Second 
World War in the Athenian defeat of the Persians. Having just vanquished a major threat and 
possessed of the military the United States assumed global responsibility. Although nominally 
adhering to a strategy of containment it became easy for politicians to exploit fear of 
communism. Recognizing this, those in power refused to back down from conflicts abroad even 
when there was little strategic interest in pursuing them for fear of repercussions back home. 
Eventually, made skittish by the “loss” of China and stalemate in Korea, the US began a 
decades-long involvement in Vietnam even though many professionals in both the military and 
intelligence communities warned against it. Eventually, as with the degradation of Athenian 
democracy, lies were told and domestic critics were silenced that seriously undermined domestic 
liberalism and faith in institutions.   
War, Corruption, and Political Incentives 
 Liberal states are based political competition in the sense that politicians that produce 
failed policies will be voted out of office and those that produce success will be reelected. 
Realistically, most people will be set on one particular set of reasonable policies, but there are 
sufficient people who look for material benefit or the success of certain policies that if a 
government is faltering in delivering goods to its citizens they will be voted out of office. This is 
why Rawls calls for strict campaign finance limitations, for instance, because to have none 
would allow interest groups to unduly influence reasonable citizens who would otherwise 
rationally evaluate the success of policies. While in office politicians are supposed to be working 
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towards the goal of improving their constituent’s lives, but in order for the system to work they 
must have at least a second-order concern for getting reelected. If they had no interest in this, 
they would not have any interest in representing the views of their constituents or working for 
them. The problematic side of this, is that politicians have frequently seen military action as a 
way of boosting their popularity. As was alluded to in the discussion of Thucydides and 
Vietnam, this is especially an issue when there is a single opponent against whom the parties can 
play each other’s responses. Applying it to the examples of terrorism and humanitarian 
intervention, it is easy to see how the party in power could be said to be “soft” on a single 
terrorist organization or country, or how the fear of being perceived in such a way would drive 
leaders to make rash decisions regarding the use of force. This is true of terrorism especially. In 
Chapter 2 the ongoing US counterterrorist assassination campaign was presented as a cautionary 
tale for liberal states, and one that deliberative legitimacy would prevent due to the necessities of 
collective action. Applying the political incentives above it is easy to see how decision makers in 
a country that has already committed itself to a degree of offensive action against terrorist 
organizations can slip into a prolonged and counterproductive campaign. 
 While deliberative legitimacy helps in preventing such a campaign from occurring, it 
does not have much bearing on the political discourse at home that often falls victim to the same 
incentive structure that ends up perpetuating violence. Even before the United States was 
involved directly in Vietnam the same political pressures that eventually drove that decision 
were animating Senator Joseph McCarthy’s demagogy, which in turn were driven by paranoid 
delusions of communist infiltration. That anti-communism remained a political litmus test 
throughout the Cold War even during periods of relative calm show that even a group of liberal 
states restrained by deliberative processes could fall victim to illiberal tendencies domestically 
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even if their foreign policy is restrained. Protracted conflict with any group of people tends to 
promote fear of that group. If conflict is strictly limited to preventing horrific atrocities and 
massive losses of life domestically or in allied states this is probably even more likely to occur. 
What is to stop even reasonable citizens from feeling fear or ill will towards another state that is 
committing genocide, particular one of a magnitude sufficient to require military intervention to 
stop it? Policy in a liberal state may require an overlapping consensus, but fear is not unique to 
any particular comprehensive conception of the good, and it could be said that reasonable 
citizens may submit to policies based on concerns for their personal safety, even if they are 
abstracted.  
 Of further concern to liberal societies who engage is prolonged conflict (or at least expect 
to) is the prominence that the military assumes in decision-making when this is the case. One of 
Kant’s arguments for the abolition of standing armies was that their very existence tends to 
prompt nations to use them, as using them and eliminating threats is cheaper than the infinite 
escalation of peace-time defense (Kant). This is even more the case when a state is actively 
engaged in armed conflict, for any expenditure can be justified as necessary to ending the war 
expeditiously. Thus, the whims of the legislature, nominally free to address what issues it 
chooses, can only be addressed after the military is sated. This is nothing to say of the 
corresponding power of arms manufacturers, whose symbiotic relationship with the military 
incentivizes frivolous purchases and reckless deployments as long as the government of a 
particular state can be influenced.  
All of these objections point to the necessity of strong liberal controls and norms over the 
employment of force. While some of these impulses can be at least mitigated by the collective 
decision-making process, the feelings of paranoia and xenophobia have nothing to do with the 
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measured decisions of the society of liberal states as a whole. Thus, the burden is laid heavily 
upon the reasonable citizens of the liberal states themselves to avoid such occurrences. Although 
best intentions often mean little against the weight of money and personal interest it seems that 
the political goals of the society of liberal states are in many ways self-reinforcing. It is 
unreasonable to suggest that any one state in a group that feels sufficiently dedicated to the ideals 
of liberal governance to defend them by force would succumb to the petty machinations of arms 
manufacturers or bureaucrats. There are examples of such entanglements, but if the reason that 
democratic peace works is that the citizenry is generally disposed to peace then it is unlikely that 
such a group would allow themselves to be manipulated by the interests of those who break the 
peace, even if it is for a good reason. 
 
Violence and Illegitimacy 
 States are predicated on the manipulation and justification of violence. Their monopoly 
over the legitimate use thereof is what gives them their essential character, and while violence is 
often exercised only implicitly the ability of the state to “get away with” violence because it is 
presupposed to have been justified is a great power. Liberal democracies, relying as they do on 
the consent of the governed to provide them with legitimacy, would then be supposed to be less 
violent with their own citizens. At the heart of this thesis is the contention that liberal 
democracies would prove to be less violent with the citizens of other states. Indeed, Rawls and 
Kant were so committed to this idea that their conceptions of liberal alliance precluded such 
states from the use of force; an argument that this thesis has argued against. It has sought to 
prove that the features of liberal democracy from which legitimacy is derived – open discourse, 
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transparency, and inclusion – can be used internationally in order to legitimize force abroad in 
order to preserve their own politics of discourse and consensus. 
 The argument that violence and force is actually a sign of impotence and illegitimacy 
poses an acute problem for the arguments laid out in this thesis. Hannah Arendt, who first 
formulated this theory of violence in 1969 in Reflections on Violence, was writing primarily 
against new-left revolutionaries, but her observations are nonetheless important when 
considering that, at base, the argument put forth in this thesis is that liberal states are sometimes 
required to be violent as a matter of survival. Considering power the opposite of violence, Arendt 
defines two types of power. The first is the simple understanding of power: the power to 
dominate and to command obedience. The second is more complex, involving obedience but not 
necessarily command: the power that laws, derived by common consent of the people, have over 
those people. The people are still expected to obey the laws, but they are not being “forced” to do 
anything because they lack a specific command to do so and because they are the ones that 
formulated the laws which they obey in the first place. Power “always stands in numbers” 
(Arendt 1969) because it relies on common acceptance. Arendt concedes that power, given 
sufficient numbers, has the potential for just as much abuse as violence does, and thus the 
corollary of power is legitimacy. Legitimacy is the means by which the power was achieved, and 
Arendt is careful to distinguish between the two.2 For Arendt, legitimacy is solely procedural: 
“Power springs up whenever people act in concert, but it derives its legitimacy from the initial 
getting together rather than from any action that then may follow” (Arendt 1969). Violence is the 
                                                
2 This is not a commonly accepted scholarly distinction. Arendt’s definition of “power” closely 
resembles this thesis’ use of “legitimacy” that is based on consensus found in scholarship. The 
paragraphs containing my response to Arendt’s critique will return to the use of legitimacy for 
voluntary obedience except when explicitly referring to Arendt’s concept. 
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opposite, for while it may be justified in individual circumstances its justification “loses in 
plausibility the farther away its intended end recedes into the future” (Arendt 1969). That is to 
say, every individual instance of violent action must be justified, ideally with an end very soon to 
come.  
 As mentioned before, Arendt’s main focus was to critique contemporaneous thinkers like 
Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre who considered violence a way out for the oppressed people 
of the world. As such, Arendt couches much of her positive argumentation in talk of revolution 
and uprising. Writing of the Prague Spring, Arendt points out that it was the Soviet’s loss of 
power that lead it to rule by “sheer violence” (Arendt 1969). Had the Soviet system retained its 
power over the Czech people there would have been no need for Soviet forces to crush the 
uprising because the uprising would never have happened in the first place. That the power of the 
Soviet Union over its satellites is one of command and obedience rather than of mutual consent 
is irrelevant. The threat of violence, insofar as it generates power, is just as much a failure once 
violence has been initiated as the breakdown of power arrived at by mutual consent of free 
people. If not checked the end result of this rule by violence is totalitarianism – the rule by terror 
without power. However, because totalitarians rule without power they differ fundamentally 
from normal autocracies which, though established through violence, content themselves with 
doing violence on their enemies and thus retain an element of power through the organization of 
their friends. Totalitarian states, on the other hand, rule entirely through violence regardless of 
disposition towards the regime, eventually snuffing out all power and ending in total paralysis 
due to fear (Arendt 1969).  
 The implications of Arendt’s theory for this thesis run along two parallel axes, the first of 
which is the tendency for seemingly hopeless situations to generate violent responses. Recognize 
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first that the situations described by this thesis do skew towards superficially hopeless and 
solution-less. Humanitarian emergencies perpetrated by an organized government can result in 
millions of lives lost and the prospect of terrorists lurking in all corners attempting to destroy the 
liberal way of life is similarly bleak, particularly when one accepts the low likelihood of being 
able to do anything about it. Furthermore, if we accept Rawls’s premise that material deprivation 
is the root cause of oppression and terror then these problems become even more intractable. 
Despite their intractability, which is often recognized, states which are afforded a recourse to 
force through laws or norms, as this thesis has argued the liberal states ought to be, often turn to 
it without knowing whether things will actually be made better for it. When holding a hammer, 
everything starts to look like a nail. This is particularly true, argues Arendt, of that which is 
pronounced “sick” or shot through with a certain problem:  
 “The notion of a ‘sick society,’ of which the riots are symptoms as fever is a 
symptom of disease – can only promote violence in the end. Thus the debate 
between those who propose violent means to restore ‘law and order’ and those 
who propose nonviolent reforms begins to sound ominously like a discussion 
between two physicians who debate the relative advantages of surgical as opposed 
to medical treatment of the patient. The sicker the patient is supposed to be, the 
more likely that the surgeon will have the last word.” (Arendt 1969) 
 
The “organic” metaphor is instructive as well because of the acute nature of the threats 
discussed by this thesis. Terrorism is an acute threat to life and, at a certain level of 
sophistication, the political system of liberal states itself. Humanitarian emergencies, 
while not possessed of the same threat to life in liberal states, generate a visceral reaction 
that leads politicians to force on behalf of an outraged electorate. Even worse, this 
visceral reaction often leads to a desire to punish those perpetrating the atrocities rather 
than the long-term process required by states in such dire straits.  
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 The preference for forceful responses is further exacerbated by the unavoidable role of 
bureaucracy in the formulation of foreign policy. Even if the worst-case scenario described 
above, that of influence capture in the decision-making bodies, does not come to pass, the 
existence of such a group at all and their general preference for violence will still unduly 
influence liberal governments. Within a bureaucracy, even one nominally under the control of an 
elected government, internal incentives to comply with the wishes of superiors mean that the 
entire operation tends towards sycophancy and self-justification. Bureaucracy, which Arendt 
terms “rule by no-one,” tends towards violence because there is no power. The lack of power 
stems from the fact that although people are acting together there is no clear will being exerted 
through the collective action. This, paired with the aforementioned self-justification, leads to the 
security bureaucracy of liberal states to continually push for forceful action even when none may 
be required. 
 The element of the bureaucracy being inherently violent is another reminder of how 
important democratic controls are. Recall that the argument for the democratic peace was, in the 
first place, that citizens are generally disinclined to go to war absent provocation and that states 
which reflect the will of their citizens will generally be peaceful. Thus, adequate political 
representation can prevent a bloated security apparatus from dominating the decision-making 
process when considering the use of force. Again deliberative legitimacy here adds another 
hurdle for those who would use force injudiciously, for it is not just the decision of any one 
liberal state to use force but rather the collective. So long as all of the states remain in proper 
consultation with one another the slide towards meeting any threat with force can be arrested by 
the citizens of other liberal states who have the power to influence their decision makers and 
ultimately get them to stop any use of force they do not wish their state to participate in.  
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 More problematic is the opposition of power and violence and what it means for the 
liberal alliance’s credibility and legitimacy outside the use of force. The end goal of the liberal 
alliance is to provide leadership for other states, with the eventual goal of liberalizing them 
through demonstrating the benefits of liberal governance and the peaceful relations between 
liberal states. If the use of violence by these states leads to the erosion of their persuasive power 
rather than the preservation of their liberal governance, then it is self-defeating and ought be 
avoided. Arendt’s critique of violence, while far-reaching, is not unlimited. The state’s power 
may well be eroded every time a police officer needs to use force, but the well from which that 
power is drawn is deep and regularly replenished if the government manages to stay responsive 
to its citizens. The highlighting of violence as the absence of power is less an argument against 
violence than an argument for the building of power.  
Rawls’s vision of the liberal alliance is not a passive group of like-minded states but an 
active leader of other states. Cosmopolitan critics of The Law of Peoples frequently decry 
Rawls’s omission of the difference principle and its robust duties of redistribution. Though their 
objections arise from perceived inconsistencies in Rawls’s position, we can add to their 
complaints the fact that aiding other states would, by Rawls’s own logic, substantially reduce the 
need for liberal states to use force. If people are much more likely to become terrorists, support 
genocidal regimes, or become aggressive towards their neighbors under conditions of material 
deprivation and the resulting use of force undermines, at least to some degree, liberal aspirations 
then the logical conclusion is that steps should be taken to prevent those problems from arising. 
Although force is called for in some extreme situations, it should be recognized that its frequent 
use does sap the liberal alliance of its legitimacy, committed as it is to peace. The interplay of aid 
given to other states and the use force is self-reinforcing, because if liberal states are seen to be 
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generally beneficent in their dealings with non-liberal states then their occasional use of force 
will be seen as more legitimate because it is assumed that other avenues had failed.    
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Conclusion 
 
 At the end of the Law of Peoples Rawls says that “political philosophy provides a long-
term goal of political endeavor, and in working toward it gives meaning to what we can do 
today” (Rawls 2001: 128). In my introduction, I alleged that political philosophy tiptoed around 
international relations because of its irreducible complexity, and while I think more engagement 
with the topic would be welcome I cannot say that at the end of this thesis Rawls’s long-term 
goal seems any more achievable with any fewer complications. Like the international community 
and its many actors, liberalism in a state is more reflective of a careful balance which must be 
maintained rather than a state reflective of any particular moment in time. Its strengths as a form 
of government also make it vulnerable: democratic accountability can lead to passing whims 
being adopted without analyzing the consequences, freedom of speech and association can lead 
to the permeation of dangerous ideas about other state or groups of people, and trust in the 
government can lead to blind faith in its decisions. In order to defend liberalism, I have argued 
that liberal states must preempt certain threats, but in doing so I warn that liberal states must not 
succumb to other instincts every bit as pernicious as those unleashed by a terrorist attack or 
humanitarian emergency.  
 Reviewing a book on the outlawing of war in the New Yorker, Louis Menand describes 
an analogy used by the authors, “There had been many efforts to change the codes of dueling and 
make it more humane, but people still dueled. Finally, dueling was banned, meaning that killing 
someone in a duel was murder, and dueling stopped. The way to stop war was, likewise, to 
remove its legal immunity.” (New Yorker 2017). Such a response is inevitable when arguing that 
war is sometimes necessary, and it has obvious appeal. In the United States for example, the 
erosion of Congressional oversight over the use of force that began with the Korean War has 
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allowed successive Presidents to plunge the US into war with little to no accountability until long 
after it has occurred. Similarly, what began as a low-intensity campaign of “legal” air strikes 
against high-profile terrorists has ballooned into a global campaign against anyone who poses a 
slight threat to US interests that has cost thousands of noncombatants their lives. Thus, it is easy 
to see the appeal of an argument which says the slope is just too slippery to be worth it.  
 I think this slide into constant warfare that we have experienced over the last two decades 
says more about the character of today’s “liberal” states and their citizens than about Rawls and 
this thesis. In Chapter 4, I addressed three primary challenges to my argument involving 
imperialism, public corruption, and the waste of political capital through violence. It is important 
to note that my responses to these concerns depended in large party on the good judgment of 
those in power, and especially of the citizens tasked with holding them to account. This thesis 
addressed the importance of maintaining citizen participation and attention because without it 
military commitments could spiral out of control or be undertaken for the wrong reasons, but the 
point is broadly applicable. Without an active and engaged citizenry a liberal democracy cannot 
be sustained in the face of any threat, let alone the threats raised by committing forces abroad.  
 Rawls’s vision for the society of liberal states should also be fundamentally changed. The 
Law of Peoples sees it as an organization which “only goes to war as allies in self-defense 
against outlaw states” (Rawls 2001: 54), while I have argued for a more activist role wherein 
decisions to use force are made as a body by liberal states rather than merely in response to 
transgressions. This change in the nature of the body to collective deliberation and decision-
making raises other questions about the extent of cooperation between liberal states, and even 
between liberal and decent states. A key implication of this transformed relationship is the role 
that distributive justice and the duty of assistance is changed by the new role taken on by the 
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liberal alliance. As alluded to in the last chapter, if liberal states want to avoid threats, and the 
violence with which those must be met. they ought to take it upon themselves to alleviate some 
of the material problems in other states. While Rawls limits the duty of assistance to burdened 
states and calls for a “cutoff” once those states reach political independence and maturity, it is 
clear that oppression and terrorism do not only originate from burdened states. Liberal leadership 
and the responsibilities accorded to the liberal alliance as the only legitimate actor against 
terrorism and humanitarian disasters incurs a reciprocal responsibility on liberal states to prevent 
those situations from arising if possible. Thus, in replying to the objections about the 
consequences of force commitment, this thesis also provides an alternate forum for liberal 
leadership by adding a security element to the moral duty to assistance.  
 Furthermore, the method by which liberal states arrive at the decision to use force offers a 
different structure for legitimating other kinds of international agreements. Many human rights 
advocates express frustrations about the international system similar to those elucidated in my 
introduction. That is, that it makes little to no distinction between states which afford their 
citizens basic human rights and democratic participation and those which afford their citizens 
neither. By limiting discussion to those who are genuinely interested in serious deliberations, 
rather than treating the international community writ large as an interested party, it might be 
possible to conclude more efficacious agreements. For most topics, only a narrow section of the 
international community is interested in them. Limiting discussion to those narrow sections 
would allow better discussion and agreements because uninterested parties cannot use 
deliberations as a proxy for other issues as easily. Additionally, the discussion in Chapter 3 about 
legitimacy and decent states has implications of a similar nature regarding their participation in 
democratic systems internationally for as long as they are denying democracy to some or all of 
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their own citizens. Perhaps all international institutions, not just those concerned with 
international security, should try and be more attuned to the domestic situations in the states 
taking part.  
 That is not to say that liberal states or international institutions should abandon the 
principle of toleration. The Law of Peoples is a book-length engagement with the paradoxes of 
inclusion and the international community, and at the end of this thesis I still agree that by-and-
large the international community should be inclusive and tolerant, even though I argue that the 
security aspects should be emphasized by liberal leadership. In the end, it is important to 
recognize that neither individual states or the international system will probably never be brought 
to a satisfying end state of a fully just international system. That said, as liberal states aspire 
towards what Rawls has characterized as a realistic utopia, they must bear in mind not only their 
own security and the corresponding promotion of liberal values, but also that they should not cast 
their domestic aspirations towards order and peace aside merely because international relations is 
complex. Rather, I argue that they should not only defend what justice they have achieved in 
their own states, but encourage it abroad and not allow complexity and short-term national 
interest to get in the way of a more just international system for all people.  
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